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The War Gaming Department of the U.S. Naval War College hosted the Fleet Arctic
Operations Game on 13-16 September 2011. The following document was prepared by the
War Gaming Department faculty and has been reviewed by the appropriate game sponsor
staff personnel. The findings in this report reflect the observations, insights and
recommendations that were derived from the participants during game play.
The War Gaming Department conducts high quality research, analysis, gaming, and
education to support the Naval War College mission, prepare future maritime leaders, and
help shape key decisions on the future of the Navy. The War Gaming Department strives to
provide interested parties with intellectually honest analysis of complex problems using a
wide range of research tools and analytical methodologies.
Game reports are developed for the game sponsor; however, the game report and related data
may be available on an as-requested basis. For additional information please contact the
Chairman, War Gaming Department, Naval War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, RI
02841 or via electronic mail at wargaming@usnwc.edu. Further information may be found
on our website, located at www.usnwc.edu/wargaming.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Introduction
The United States Naval War College (NWC) in Newport, Rhode Island hosted the Fleet Arctic
Operations Game (FAOG) on 13-16 September 2011. The FAOG was developed and executed
under the sponsorship of Commander, Second Fleet (C2F) initially and then Commander, U.S.
Fleet Forces (USFF) following the integration of the two staffs. The purpose of the FAOG was to
identify gaps that limit sustained maritime operations in the Arctic and recommend DOTMLPFP actions in order to inform United States Navy leadership.
After reviewing the research literature, the game sponsor and NWC Wargaming Department
(WGD) jointly developed three overarching objectives based on C2F‟s areas of interest:


Develop prioritized DOTMLPF-P maritime actions which support implementation of the
Arctic Road Map.



List the DOTMLPF-P gaps in maritime forces‟ ability to conduct sustained maritime
operations in the Arctic.



Develop near-term strategies to mitigate these identified gaps.

These objectives were framed to consider the operational level factors (e.g., risk, time space,
force composition, physical and environmental) that influence the maritime force‟s ability to
perform its missions. Additionally, these objectives allowed for consideration of potential
partnerships and interoperability issues encountered among U.S. and international forces and
organizations.

Participants and Game Structure
In addition to serving as a highly analytic event, the FAOG was designed to enhance
participants‟ understanding of potential challenges and cooperative strategies for conducting
sustained maritime operations in the Arctic. Players were selected based on their specialized
knowledge of the Arctic region or functional expertise related to planning, operations and cold
weather systems. A broad range of backgrounds were sought to ensure that as many perspectives
and variables as possible were considered during game play. More than half of the participants in
the four planning cells came from military and civilian operational commands and provided
expert perspectives from various aspects of sustaining operations in an austere environment. The
players in the White Cell were primarily from government, academia and industry and provided
expertise on strategy and policy as well as systems and climatology issues concerning the Arctic
region.
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Primary Findings
Theme 1: The U.S. Navy is inadequately prepared to conduct sustained maritime
operations in the Arctic region. This assertion is due to the poor reliability of current
capabilities as well as the need to develop new partnerships, ice capable platforms,
infrastructure , satellite communications and training. Efforts to strengthen relationships
and access to specialized capabilities and information should be prioritized. Currently, U.S.
Forces are characterized by an inability to reliably perform and maintain operations in the austere
Arctic environment. Reliability is improved by the acquisition and development of information
and capabilities made available through strong relationships in order to complete the mission and
reduce the likelihood of risk. The U.S. Navy currently must seek these from external
stakeholders.
Theme 2: As weather and climate conditions intensify (particularly the presence of ice,
strong winds and fog) and as the total time and distance traveled during an operation
increases, the greater the risk of both mission failure and loss of or harm to friendly forces
becomes. Players placed significant importance on the idea that harsh environmental conditions
and large distances will likely create uncertainty in planning and the timeliness of response,
which in turn could create conditions which exceed current operational capabilities.
Understanding the austere Arctic environment and its impact on the design limitations of aircraft
and surface warships is critical to planning operations in the Arctic region.
Theme 3: In order to reduce risk, players increasingly relied on additional information and
capabilities through partnerships with the USCG, JTF Alaska, tribal leaders, industry, and
multinational partners. As risk increased due to extreme climatic conditions and increased
operating and support distances, there was a corresponding increase in the need for specialized
information and capabilities. As this trend increased, the required information and capabilities
became less available in the U.S. Navy and planners were forced to look elsewhere for the
capabilities needed to execute their mission tasking. At the low end of the scale, these could be
found inside DoD, but eventually planners needed to rely on industry, international partners, or
the whole of U.S. Government. This further reiterates that sustainability in Arctic operations is
significantly dependent on strong relationships with international, regional and local partners in
government and industry. Mechanisms that strengthen these ties should be prioritized in future
planning.
Theme 4: The future application of solutions developed during the game was influenced by
the frequency of operations and desired reliability of U.S. Naval forces in the Arctic.
Specifically, the more frequent or consistently expected operations or missions would be
conducted, the more suitable long term proposed solutions were found to be. Conversely, when
less frequent or consistent operations or missions were anticipated, mitigating strategies or shortterm solutions were found to be acceptable. Long term solutions tended to be more formalized
5
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and structured in nature while the majority of mitigating strategies were more informal,
temporary and less structured.

Subsidiary Findings
Major DOTMLPF-P Gaps, Mitigating Strategies and Proposed Solutions
The overall assessment produced by the game was that the U.S. Navy does not have the means
needed to support sustained operations in the Arctic. This was due primarily to the lack of
appropriate ship types to operate in or near Arctic ice, the lack of support facilities in the Arctic,
and finally the lack of sufficient or capable logistics connectors to account for the long logistics
distances and lack of facilities. As noted in Theme 1, these gaps were mitigated or closed
through the use of domestic and international relationships with military, coast guard and
industry partners which made information or capabilities available to support scenario missions.
However, the game identified that many of these relationships and the information and capability
requirements that they enable do not exist or are poorly defined, further exacerbating the materiel
issues listed above.
Major CONOPS Changes
Overall, the players identified the Arctic Maritime Response Force CONOPS as a valuable tool
to support sustained maritime operations in the Arctic. There were three primary changes
identified to the CONOPS. First, the focus of the CONOPS should be shifted from warfighting to
include the missions identified by Task Force Climate Change as more likely to be a
requirement. These include HA/DR, regional security cooperation, maritime security and
Maritime Domain Awareness missions. Second, the CONOPS needs to address the likelihood
that mission requirements will include short notice crisis response actions. Currently, all
planning guidance in the CONOPS allows for extended planning and deployment timelines.
Third, the CONOPS should be expanded from an Atlantic Fleet perspective to address access to
the Arctic from the Pacific and operations in multiple Combatant Commander and fleet areas or
responsibility (AORs).

Recommendations
The recommendations generated by this game are characterized by their potential for immediate
impact at the operational level and the feasibility of near-term implementation. These actions are:
establish USFF Arctic Working Group or Arctic Center of Excellence; update CONOPS and
applicable doctrine to reflect game insights; deploy to the Arctic; build domestic and
international relationships; develop and manage lessons learned database; and pursue identified
areas for further research.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Statement of Sponsor’s Interest in this Topic
Commander, USFF requested the Naval War College (NWC) to develop and execute a game
which explored potential gaps that limit the U.S. Navy‟s ability to conduct sustained maritime
operations in the Arctic. This game, referred to hereafter as the Fleet Arctic Operations Game
(FAOG), sought to identify specific capability gaps, mitigating strategies and proposed solutions
to conducting sustained maritime operations in the Arctic. Additionally, this game sought to
identify improvements to the Arctic Maritime Response Force Concept of Operations
(CONOPS) within the context of eight distinct scenarios. USFF‟s primary interest in exploring
operations in the Arctic within this context stems from the premise stated in the Arctic Road Map
that changing conditions in the Arctic (e.g., opening of new passages and an increase in
commercial shipping) will require an increased U.S. Navy presence. In order to respond to any
emerging threat or incident in the Arctic, USFF also posited that numerous gaps exist in the
Navy‟s ability to conduct sustained maritime operations in the Arctic.
The two overarching documents that guided the development of this research project included
the C2F Arctic Maritime Response Force Concept of Operations (CONOPS) Initial Draft
Version 1 and the United States Navy Arctic Road Map. The CONOPS provided primary
reference for the players during game play, and was used during post-game analysis for
comparing and contrasting findings of the game.

Objectives/Rationale for this Game
Based on USFF‟s area of interest and informed by the scholarly literature review, the Fleet
Arctic Operations Game was structured to explore three objectives. The mutually-agreed-upon
objectives developed by C2F and the War Gaming Department of the Naval War College are:
•
Develop a prioritized list of DOTMLPF-P maritime actions to support implementation of
the Arctic Road Map at the Operational Level.
•
List DOTMLPF-P gaps in the maritime forces‟ ability to conduct sustained maritime
operations in the Arctic.
•
Develop near-term strategies to mitigate identified gaps and update the Arctic Maritime
Response Force (AMRF) CONOPS.
It should be noted that all three objectives are primarily analytical in nature. However, this event
was also designed to provide experiential value for the players who participated.
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Overarching Research Questions
Based upon USFF‟s area of interest, subsequent literature review by the Naval War College‟s
WGD faculty, and the three primary objectives for this game, the following three overarching
research questions were developed:


What DOTMLPF-P gaps limit the Navy‟s ability to conduct sustained maritime
operations in the Arctic?



What near-term strategies mitigate these DOTMLPF-P gaps?



What are the prioritized DOTMLPF-P maritime actions which support implementation of
the Arctic Road Map?

These research questions are framed to consider the operational level factors (e.g., risk, time
space, force composition, physical and environmental) that influence the maritime force‟s ability
to perform its missions. Additionally, these research questions will also consider potential
partnerships and interoperability issues encountered among U.S. and international forces and
organizations.

Identification of Independent and Dependent Variables
The two independent variables in this game consist of the DOTMLPF-P gaps (x1) and near-term
mitigating strategies (x2). The primary dependent variable is the cells ability to conduct
sustained maritime operations in the Arctic. In addition, in order to fully assess the U.S. Navy‟s
ability to conduct sustained military operations in the Arctic, a series of mediator (z) variables,
including the operational factors (e.g. time, space, force composition) (z1) and physical and
environmental factors (z2) are introduced throughout the entire duration of game play. These
factors are pre-scripted and tailored to each move during the game and are provided to the
players prior to execution. These mediating variables were assigned in a manner to be
progressively more challenging for the players as the game progressed.
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II. GAME DESIGN & RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Discussion of Game Design
Faculty assigned to the NWC‟s War Gaming Department (WGD) within the Center for Naval
Warfare Studies (CNWS) engaged in a preliminary literature review in order to appropriately
delve into C2F‟s area of interest. The two overarching documents that guided the development of
this research project included the C2F Arctic Maritime Response Force Concept of Operations
(CONOPS) Initial Draft Version 1 and the United States Navy Arctic Road Map. The CONOPS
served as the primary reference for the players during game play, and was used during post-game
analysis for comparing and contrasting findings of the game. Review of additional literature of
historical writings on Arctic operations using student papers in the Naval War College library
was also sought.
As an applied research and evaluation project, a one sided, seminar style game, which
incorporated elements of the operational planning process, was designed in order to focus on
specific events through an inductive lens. Such a process is best suited when addressing complex
operational issues including those raised in the research questions. This approach also affords
the opportunity to have the experts, operators, and planners from multiple disciplines describe
the operational environment in the Arctic, assesses current and future programs and systems, and
identify challenges to sustaining maritime operations in the Arctic. The game empowered
participants to make assessments of various conditions and factors impacting the ability to
conduct sustained maritime operations. The value of this methodology is that it opened the
aperture and allowed the participants to explore the issues from many angles without having the
participants be constrained by any single hypothesis. This was a single continuous game whereby
each move built upon previous ones. Throughout each move, players were afforded the
opportunity to use previous improvements made to the CONOPS and apply them to following
moves.
An independent white cell reviewed and analyzed player cell derived plans to develop an insights
and implications product. The White Cell was comprised of approximately thirty senior U.S.
civilian and military stakeholders with extensive knowledge of current future maritime
capabilities and programs, as well as representatives from several international maritime partner
nations and Arctic subject matter experts from academe. The White Cell was charged with
reviewing and analyzing each cell‟s course of action gaps, mitigating strategies, proposed
solutions and CONOPS updates. During this review process, the Cell generated a PowerPoint
Slide that captured their major insights and implications. White Cell members developed these
inputs through the lenses of C2, Intel, FIRES, Logistics and other observations. During game
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play, members of the White Cell also answered incoming requests for information (RFIs) from
each of the player cells. White Cell members participated in all combined plenary sessions.
In order to ground the players in a shared experience, the Fleet Arctic Operations Game began on
September 13, 2011 with several background briefs covering the Arctic Maritime Response
Force Concept of Operations, cold weather systems and platforms and programs, as well as U.S.
and International maritime perspectives on current operations in the Arctic.

Game Mechanics
Following the briefing sessions, approximately 88 players were divided into five focus groups
(or cells), with 56 players in each of groups A, B, C and D to examine sustained operations in the
Arctic from Atlantic and Pacific coast perspectives, and 32 players in the White Cell developed
strategic level insights and implications of each groups‟ moves. A summary of the players‟
backgrounds, including functional area of expertise, education, and years of experience is found
in Appendix E of this game report. A technology demonstration of the knowledge management
game tool and Multi Touch Multi User interface was presented to the players.
Subsequently, players engaged in an operational domain problem framing activity to explore
various factors (i.e., people, places, environment, and relationships) that maritime leaders should
consider when planning or conducting sustained maritime operations in the Arctic. Definitions
for each of these factors are found in Appendix F of this game report. This activity served as a
mechanism to foster robust, facilitated discussion within the game cells and as the initial mission
analysis phase for scenarios that would be introduced the following day. Insights from this
activity can be found in section III of this report.
At the conclusion of the facilitated discussion, participants completed a baseline survey and postactivity survey to capture their individual thoughts and insights (see Appendix C). Each cell
populated proposed planning assumptions into the game tool, which served as an input by the
Control Cell for the development of the overarching assumptions used for game play.
Additionally, the control cell examined the survey data, key insights presented in plenary and
critical assumptions identified by the analysis team during this activity. The control team
developed injects for subsequent game moves in order to provide players a common foundation
to plan from.
At the beginning of each move, the cells were presented with a scenario which included the
environmental conditions, tailored operational task, and strategic guidance from command
authority. These scenarios (e.g., missions and environmental conditions) provided players with
the opportunity to plan sustained maritime operations in the Arctic under myriad conditions
which became more challenging as the game progressed. Cell A (Atlantic) was paired with Cell
B (Pacific) and Cell C (Atlantic) with Cell D (Pacific). Within a move, each pair received a
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different scenario which was additionally tailored for the geographic area for each cell. During
moves, all four cells concurrently sought to develop a Course of Action which focused
discussion on efforts to identify gaps, mitigating strategies, proposed solutions, and
improvements to the CONOPS associated with that scenario. Players supported the development
of a PowerPoint presentation which summarized the major insights derived from the group
during the move. These PowerPoint slides were used as to stimulate discussion in facilitated
plenary sessions. Finally, players completed a post-move survey to capture individual
perspectives and opinions.
At the conclusion of each move, Cells A and B, and cells C and D subsequently came together
for two distinct moderated plenary discussions. During these sessions, the group leads presented
the cells Course of Action and major insights regarding gaps, solutions and improvements to the
CONOPS. Subsequently, a Naval War College faculty member facilitated follow-on discussions
regarding key insights and themes developed by the analysis team where participants had the
opportunity to compare and contrasted insights identified in their respective groups. On the final
day of the game, each cell prioritized an aggregated list of mitigating strategies and proposed
solutions developed by all cells over game play. Players then engaged in two distinct final
combined plenary sessions. Additional player insights not readily discernable from the
PowerPoint briefs were captured.

Analytic Framing
The overall framing for this game is a combination of qualitative grounded induction (framed
through the C2F‟s lens of U.S. Navy presence in the Arctic) and more traditional quantitative
deduction. The post-game analytic process follows a widely-used process referred to as
triangulation. Current thinking in the field of social research suggests that a variety of analytic
tools should be employed in behaviorally based activities such as war games, thus maximizing
the credibility of the worki. One widely accepted methodology that takes advantage of multiple
data collection techniques is “triangulation.ii This approach allows us to derive the same or very
similar conclusions using different datasets or methods.iii Much of the strength of triangulation
stems from its ability to “distinguish between the idiosyncratic…and the representative.”iv This
method also allows the researcher to “…base inquiry in the assumptions being used… [and]
evaluate questions…with the appropriate methodology rather than the methodology driving the
evaluation.”v
Consistent with this approach, data streams collected during this game will incorporate a variety
of research procedures into analysis. A brief description of each analytic tool follows. The
overarching triangulation approach is also depicted in the figure found in this section of the
DCAP.
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Content Analysis: Described as “a…method whereby a researcher seeks objectively to
describe the content of communication messages that people have previously
produced”vi. “Content analysis involves identifying coherent and important
examples…and patterns in the data… [and subdividing]…data into coherent categories,
patterns, and themes.”vii For the purposes of this game, content will be binned to
determine which, if any, of the focus areas presented in this DCAP are supported by
player actions, comments, or control team assessment.



Grounded Theory: A more detailed, methodologically sound approach to analysis than
the initial step of content analysis, grounded theory employs systematic, hierarchical
procedures to develop inductively derived theory grounded in data. Rooted from the
discipline of sociology, grounded theory “directs researchers to look for patterns in data
so that they can make general statements about the phenomena they examined”viii. For the
purposes of this game, the DCAT will be using “an inductive, theory discovery
methodology that allows the researcher to develop a theoretical account of the general
features of a topic while simultaneously grounding the account in empirical observations
or data”ix The primary tool used during post game analysis to facilitate this process is
Atlas.ti. Coding will consist of both selective and in-vivo techniques, based on the
DCAT‟s review of the relevant literature and the suggested key search terms in the
players‟ own words.



Data Visualization: Atlas.ti, a grounded induction coding software will be used to depict
associations and relationships between disparate data. Word Clouds also were generated
to capture and visually depict most frequent words derived from participants. x



Ethnography: DCAT members will capture qualitative, descriptive data through
observation and listening to participants within a natural setting to understand the social
interactions and rational of their decisions and activities during the course of game play..
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In addition to these four primary analytic processes, Likert-based survey questions were
analyzed using descriptive tools such as mean, median, mode, standard deviation, and variance.
This allowed the DCAT to discuss the variance and player cohesion across the cells.

Content
Analysis

Grounded Theory

Descriptive Statistics

Ethnography

.
Data Visualization

Collection Approach
The datasets collected and analyzed in this game are considered descriptive because they “reveal
the nature of certain situations, settings, processes, relationships… [and] systems…”xi Because
13
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they are descriptive, the focus of the DCAT prior to presenting these datasets to the Commander,
USFF is to aggregate and “assess the data and clarify the information that has been gathered”xii .
The primary datasets that were aggregated in this game are, in priority order, (1) Player
Generated insights via Game Tool, (2) Player Surveys, (3) Plenary PowerPoint slides, and (4)
Ethnographic notes from cell interactions and plenary sessions (5) Web IQ inputs. A summary of
the datasets and their corresponding analytic methodologies are included in Annex (F).
All of the Data Collection and Analysis Team (DCAT) members involved in these collection
efforts received instruction in proper data capture techniques during a pre-game bootstrap
session. DCAT members were responsible for ensuring quality assurance/quality control of the
datasets submitted during game play. Specifically, DCAT members ensured the following
parameters were implemented for these four datasets used for post-game analysis and
development of final deliverables:


Formatting and standardization: Game control staff will have available standard
templates for PowerPoint deliverables and data collection notes. Templates will be
located in folders for each cell and move. PowerPoint slides will be completed to the
same standard across all four game cells.



Internal validity: Collection instruments are designed correctly to ensure that accurate
conclusions can be drawn from the data. To ensure their proper use during game play,
specific internal validity issues with these instruments and the information they are
designed to collect were identified during the Alpha and Beta tests.



External validity: Due to the inherent challenges posed by ensuring consistent,
accurate measurement in gamesxiii, criterion validity is used to “see if the results from
an item or set of measures (a scale) are similar to some external standards or
criteria.”xiv External validity applies predominately to the baseline questions that will
be asked in the individual player surveys to be captured via the Unclassified
GAMENET on 13 through 16 September 2011. In order to “provide…quality controls
on data collection”xv these questions were evaluated by an internal focus group as part
of the Alpha and Beta testing process, prior to being deployed in the game.

Specific roles were assigned to the DCAT based upon their experience, education, and interests.
The specific functions assigned to the DCAT, along with the names of those personnel
designated to perform them, are as follows:
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III. ANALYSIS & RESULTS
Analysis of Game Moves
This section provides an overview of the main themes that players derived as justifications for
the activities they discussed. The analysis team explored these player-derived themes and
compared them to the data from game play. Players, through an inductive reasoning process,
derived a number of hypotheses or themes throughout the game and coalesced on the final day of
game play. A mixed methods approach, consisting of various qualitative and quantitative
techniques was utilized for triangulation purposes in order to achieve credible and reliable
findings from the data collected. Game data were coded, grouped in categories, and themes were
developed by the analysis team. Data included post-move surveys, group PowerPoint slides,
ethnographic notes, cell game tool decisions, and Web IQ threaded discussions.
Theme 1: The U.S. Navy is inadequately prepared to conduct sustained maritime
operations in the Arctic region. This assertion is due to the poor reliability of current
capabilities as well as the need to develop new partnerships, ice capable platforms,
infrastructure development and training. Efforts to strengthen relationships and access to
specialized capabilities and information should be prioritized.
Sustainability creates and maintains the conditions which allow maritime forces to carry out
operations at the operational level within a sea, or ocean area, the adjacent coastal area, islands,
and the airspace above in order to achieve a desired end state. Sustainability is ensured by the
maintenance and acquisition of requisite capabilities and resources to carry out operations in the
Arctic region. Accordingly, reliability emerged as a key enabling factor to ensure sustainability
and reduce risk. Currently, U.S. Forces are characterized by an inability to reliably perform and
maintain operations in the austere Arctic environment. Reliability is improved by the acquisition
and development of information and capabilities made available through strong relationships in
order to complete the mission and reduce the likelihood of risk. The U.S. Navy currently must
seek these from external stakeholders. Figure 1 is a graphical representation of the major
categories and relationships that were derived from game play, which in turn, form the basis for
subsequent sections under theme 1. This relationship is described in Figure 1 which shows
reliability and sustainability to be linked to specialized information and capabilities which are
currently enabled by strong relationships. Theme 1 depicts the major areas focused on during
game play and concludes that, of the DOTMLPF-P and CONOPS recommendations described in
this report, those actions connected to strengthening relationships and improving the availability
of specialized information and capabilities should have the highest priority for the U.S. Navy.
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Figure 1. Themes and Relationships Diagram
Relationships and Partnerships
Coordination and Collaboration
Building maritime partnerships with Arctic countries is critical prior to planning for or
responding to any emerging crisis in the region. The need for regional cooperative security
agreements with international navies and coast guards was identified in order to ensure reliability
and sustainment of future contingency operations. Similarly, due to budget constraints and
limited capabilities and resources, an increased emphasis was on the need to leverage regional
partner capacities. This cooperation and coordination focused on all countries that make up the
Arctic nations or those with Arctic capabilities. Specifically, leveraging multinational maritime
ice breakers, ice-capable vessels, and the need to share information related to maritime activity
and the environment (e.g., weather, ice, fog, etc.) was postulated in order to develop and
maintain Arctic Domain Awareness.
In order to improve interoperability, leverage capabilities, and share information between
services, interagency and international maritime partners in the long term, the establishment of a
standing Arctic Joint Task Force or maritime coordination center was suggested. When
describing characteristics of this future cooperative security model, participants drew several
parallels to Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South. This model was commonly referred to
as „JIATF- North‟. It was also suggested that this model could fall under the responsibility of
16
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Commander, U.S. Northern Command. Conversely, this model was also discussed as a
supporting element to a much broader security initiative within the Arctic Council. The existing
Joint Task Force (JTF) Alaska model was also highlighted as a means to facilitate cooperation
and coordination among entities. However, discussions over the course of the game rapidly
evolved to encompass a much broader scope of regional partnerships. The use of Arctic
exchange officers on Canadian, Russian, Norwegian and Danish ships was recommended in
order to build experience and corporate knowledge in the region.
While player moves across the game leveraged substantial international support and
coordination, players simultaneously sought to leverage and integrate all domestic resources,
training, and capabilities. Due to budget constraints, capability gaps in resources, lack of subject
matter expertise and operational experience, as well as the distance from homeport to theater,
players asserted that the Department of Defense should consider the formulation of a “Whole of
Government” strategy to facilitate operations in the Artic.
Discussing the relevance of relationships in the Arctic, it was suggested to “institutionalize
relationships to leverage available assets from all potential sources; the Navy has extremely
limited capability to project power in a surface maritime environment, on behalf of U.S. in the
Arctic, including our own U.S. waters, regardless of the geopolitical or emergency situation.”
Leverage Industry Capabilities and Best Practices
The United States Navy should leverage industry and commercial capabilities to aid in
navigation, sustainment and replenishment at sea. Establishing relationships with regional
suppliers was identified as an essential first step to better understanding the challenges and best
practices for operating in the austere environment. In order to support these initiatives, the
development and application of procedures and policies for non-traditional logistical support to
operations is needed. One cell suggested using NAVSEA engineers to resolve integration issues
between naval platforms, systems, the operating environment and industry. Initiating these
concepts would provide reliability, in terms of quicker access to capabilities that are currently
limited or nonexistent in the Arctic region.
Limited Capabilities and Platforms
Acquisition of Ice-Capable Vessels
The limited availability of ice-capable platforms and fuel was a consistent theme that emerged
from game play. Throughout the game, the severity of risk to mission and friendly forces was
attributed to the inability to effectively sustain operations as a result of limited ice capable
platforms. Accordingly, the most significant capability gap identified throughout the game was
the inability to navigate in the Arctic region due to the lack of ice capable vessels. Without these
17
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mission-capable assets, the U.S. Navy cannot sustain operations without substantial support from
the U.S. Coast Guard and international partners.
Accordingly, a comprehensive acquisition strategy for procuring, leasing, and retrofitting ice
capable platforms is needed in order to support sustained year round operations in the Arctic.
Specifically, the need to improve existing USCG ice breakers (AGBs), procure additional ice
breakers for use by the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard, and the need to retrofit existing U.S. Navy
vessels was also identified. The need to generate requirements for heavy lift, cold-weather
capable and vertical lift capable aircraft as well as the acquisition of U.S. organic ice rated units
to conduct work in the Arctic was highly suggested. One player noted, “Because the Arctic
environment is vastly different from most operating environments, the development of an
acquisition strategy should be analogous to preparing platforms to operate in high temperature
desert conditions”.
The development of an Arctic Capabilities Strategy “must include educational, developmental
and operational components” to facilitate cooperative exercises with relevant U.S. and
international stakeholders through “testing of actual capabilities of a range of seasonal
conditions.” Lessons learned from Arctic operations “would integrate into Service POMs,
CCDR IPLs, and other USG resource claimant processes, as well as policy processes and
priorities. The Arctic needs to be considered from both sovereignty and energy aspects, as well
as other concerns.”
Satellite Communications (SATCOM)
The reliability reach-back capabilities and robust communications is critical in the rapidly
changing conditions in the Arctic. Currently, the ability to sustain communications with chain of
command while operating in the Arctic is limited due to the ineffectiveness of geosynchronous
satellite coverage in the Arctic Circle. The acquisition of additional satellite coverage and
bandwidth, the need to generate requirements for that coverage, and the of increase global
commercial and military satellite communications footprint was discussed as essential elements
for obtaining access in the Arctic.
Logistics and Infrastructure Development
The insufficient infrastructure to facilitate logistics when attempting to sustain operations in the
Arctic was heavily emphasized in the game. The United States cannot conduct sustained
operations in the Arctic without a reliable fuel source. Harsh environmental and physical
conditions demand special considerations in order for critical systems to function and support
any shipboard or aircraft operations. In order to mitigate these challenges in the short term, the
United States Navy should leverage DOD, industry and multinational logistics hubs and
platforms. In the long term, the development of permanent infrastructure at the mid-point of a
NWP transit capable of providing fuel to maritime assets was recommended. Additionally, the
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strategic positioning of port facilities throughout the Arctic in order to resupply vessels in transit
was highly desired. The development of doctrine for logistical support to operations in the
Arctic was also highlighted throughout game play. One cell described the need to incorporate
maintenance practices to include augmenting Operational Sequencing System (OSS) procedures
in current doctrine and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs).
Knowledge and Awareness
There was a substantial lack of knowledge and awareness among U.S. Navy personnel of
required training and capabilities that generate requisite capabilities (e.g., platforms, systems,
equipment, etc.). Specifically, there was a considerable gap in awareness and knowledge among
U.S. maritime operators and planners with respect to the environment (e.g., climate and wildlife).
Personnel planning or deploying to the Arctic would require specialized skill sets which are not
currently available in U.S. Navy training pipeline or professional military education. One player
noted “Encountering unpredictable sea ice conditions will present a planning challenge, of which
can only be overcome by institutional awareness and responsive adaptive force packaging.”
With respect to environmental data, accurate and timely environmental data (e.g., hydrographic
surveys, typography, and forecasting) is essential to decreasing risk to mission and friendly
forces and the overall success of the mission. Particularly, one player noted, “the accuracy in
data related to the environment will aid planners and operators for potential missions in the
region.” Current hydrographic surveys being conducted were described as “inadequate to safely
conduct sustained Arctic operations.” Players also identified the inability to understand the
widely distributed and diverse group of semiaquatic marine mammals in the Arctic region.
However, of all wildlife species discussed, the polar bear continuously emerged because of its
dependence on sea ice, its significance to the Arctic marine ecosystem and interaction with
potential visitors (e.g., maritime operators in the region).
In order to achieve and manage shared awareness, foster creative thinking and explore various
issues and problems related to the Arctic, the establishment of an Arctic “Center of Excellence
(COE)” was suggested. This center would facilitate research, education and training for
deployed U.S. Navy operators and other joint, interagency and international stakeholders
deploying to the Arctic region. Developing, executing and maintaining this COE was discussed
as a primary augment to the proposed JIATF-North concept. Specifically, there is a need to focus
on the education of Arctic operations, the environment, and current and future infrastructure,
capabilities, and partnerships.
Training for Planners and Operators
The overarching theme derived from „training‟ focused on the need to identify a comprehensive
list of training prerequisites in order to conduct sustained cold weather operations and determine
which training should be developed and maintained within the Department of the Navy.
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Emphasis was placed on consistent coordination with USCG to identify and coordinate Arctic
related training requirements. Similarly, there is also a need to develop and execute training with
international partners in the region. The focus was specifically related to coordinating and
leveraging training curricula and facilities of Canada, Norway, and Russia in order to garner
specific tactics, techniques and procedures for conducting sustained maritime operations in the
Arctic. Lastly, the USN needs to train deployed personnel in polar bear mitigation, cold weather
systems and platforms, cold weather survivability, and cold weather gear.
Lessons Learned
Lesson learned in the form of knowledge or understanding of operations in the Arctic gained by
experience through both US and international maritime stakeholders was a key requirement
generated by the game. “There needs to be a paradigm shift from lessons learned to lessons
applied.” An increased focus was placed on the limited application of lessons learned among
U.S. Navy personnel from previous operations to new ones. These lessons learned were viewed
as a key vehicle to improve both individual and organizational proficiency, inform planning, and
risk management for a particular operation in the Arctic region.
Due to the lack of knowledge and experience of U.S. Navy planning and operations in the Arctic,
the USN should seek to leverage lessons learned from USCG, industry and multinational
partners. There was also an overwhelmingly need to develop and institutionalize a process to
capture key lessons learned regarding Arctic operations and integrate them into planning and the
CONOPS. Lessons learned should be managed and disseminated through central database or
forum in order to provide consistency, accuracy and timeliness of information. This information
should be complementary to the CONOPS and AJP 3.1
Conversely, lessons learned were also discussed in terms of how other relevant stakeholders in
the Arctic could leverage U.S. Navy lessons learned. The Joint Lessons Learned Information
System (JLLIS) was noted as an entity that could facilitate this process or be integrated into a
database that captures specific lessons learned related to the Arctic. One player noted, “Having a
reliable and efficient central location for planners and operators to go to prepare for this
environment would be invaluable.” Specifically, there is a need to capture and integrate key
lessons learned in the areas of logistics and refueling, local culture, existing relationships among
industry and multinational partners, and how the environment impacts platforms and systems.
The Arctic Submarine Lab was frequently cited as an existing forum that captures key lessons
learned related to operations in the Arctic.
Lastly, the proposed Arctic “Center of Excellence” was cited as a tool that could be maintained
or integrated into a more structured formalized working group or forum in the U.S. Navy that
facilities all information related to planning and operations in the Arctic (e.g., at the operational
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level). This formalized group of subject matter experts would be complementary to Task Force
Climate Change, which conducts strategic level analysis on matters related to the Arctic.
Theme 2: As weather and climate conditions intensify (particularly the presence of ice,
strong winds and fog) and as the total time and distance traveled during an operation
increases, the greater the risk of both mission failure and loss of or harm to friendly forces.
While this conclusion may seem rather intuitive, it is fully supported by the analysis of player
responses and game play. In the Arctic, risk is increased significantly as compared to non-Arctic
operations due to both the austerity of available support and logistics infrastructure,
characterized by great distances between operating areas and even the simplest logistics hub, and
the extreme conditions caused by the Arctic environment which are unlike those that the Navy
has become accustomed to in recent decades. These factors are critical to operational planners
contemplating actions in the Arctic and also significant when considering priorities for the
implementation of DOTMLPF-P and CONOPS recommendation made in this report.

Figure 2. Factors that Impact Risk
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Weather and Climate
Ice and fog conditions, and to a lesser extent, precipitation and wind were identified as essential
elements that adversely affect the ability to conduct maritime operations in a timely manner.
There is a short window of opportunity for ice capable platforms and equipment to arrive on
scene and execute the mission before conditions deteriorate. Accordingly, the response time was
anticipated to be slower than in lower latitudes due to environmental extremes and lack of
infrastructure. Similarly, there is a limited time window to deploy and employ units to conduct
salvage operations at depths requiring saturation and cold water diving. The ice adversely
impacted existing naval platforms‟ ability to conduct long term sustained operations in the
Arctic. One player noted, “not only do severe ice conditions adversely impact naval platforms,
but also water intake and treatment systems on board”.
With respect to air operations, persistent cold weather and freezing rain would severely impact
rotary wing aircraft maintainability unless shipboard hangar facilities are available. Similarly,
cloud cover and fog makes persistent surveillance very difficult, especially during the summer
months. Due to limited ice capable vessels, players often opted to send aircraft to conduct
surveillance missions in the Arctic.
One player noted, “I sense a certain level of complacency about operating in the Arctic with
respect to the weather, ice and ocean conditions that will affect platforms, materiel and
personnel. Environmental conditions should not be under-estimated”.
Time and Distance
The large distance required to transport supplies to an area of concern greatly inhibited the
ability to sustain required time on station. Similarly, the inability to refuel and conduct resupply
due to inadequate infrastructure in the region presented the greatest difficulties for players.
Specifically, “the lack of refueling capabilities in the Arctic and long distances between refueling
stations make it improbable to have a ship (small boy) transit through the Northwest Passage to
San Diego.” In order to maintain required time on station, sufficient lead time should be
allocated when transiting long distances. Infrastructure development in the region, consistent
port calls and the use of resupply vessels were discussed as primary solutions to mitigate these
shortfalls.
Theme 3. In order to reduce the likelihood of risk, there was an increased reliance on
additional information and capabilities through partnerships with the USCG, JTF Alaska,
Tribal Leaders, Industry, and Multinational Partners.
Figure 3 shows that as risk increased due to extreme climatic conditions and increased operating
and support distances there was a corresponding increase in the need for specialized information
and capabilities. As this trend increased, the required information and capabilities became less
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available in the U.S. Navy and planners were forced to solicit external stakeholders for the
capabilities needed to execute their mission tasking. At the low end of the scale, these could be
found inside DoD, but eventually planners needed to rely on industry, international partners, and
the whole of U.S. Government. This further reiterates that sustainability in Arctic operations is
significantly dependent on strong relationships with all of these entities and that mechanisms that
strengthen these ties should be prioritized in future planning. It is also noteworthy that a limit
beyond which sustained Arctic operations become impossible, even in the case of perfect
relationships and availability to capabilities and information because it is not yet technically
feasible to operate in some environments.

Figure 3. Relationship between information and capabilities and Risk
Information
As distance and weather factors increased during the game, the more reliance on specialized
information increased. Planners became more reliant on receiving (e.g., pulling) additional
information pertaining to the environment, wildlife, and indigenous populations in addition to
augmentation by available and capable platforms and personnel in order to develop MDA and
accomplish the mission. Conversely, as these factors increased over game play, there was an
increased emphasis on the importance and necessity to disseminate (i.e., push) information to the
media, indigenous populace, industry and the international community in order to support
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strategic communications efforts, gain access to specific locations, and broaden coordination and
response efforts.
Capabilities
Similarly, as both distance and weather factors intensified over the game, the more specialized
and less available capabilities were. Unique capability shortfalls were identified with respect to
specific platforms (e.g., ice hardened vessels and ice breakers), subject matter experts (e.g.,
environmental, systems and platforms), logistics infrastructure (e.g., refuel and resupply) and
personnel (e.g., operators trained in cold weather operations) unique to the missions encountered
during the game. As additional specialized capability requirements emerged during the game, the
more players realized how limited their options were. This encouraged them to focus on the
value and importance of leveraging local, state, federal and multinational capabilities.
Theme 4: The future application of solutions developed during the game was influenced by
the frequency of operations and desired reliability of U.S. Naval forces in the Arctic.
As this game was conducted at the operational level, it was understood that many of the long
term solutions may prove to be too expensive or strategically unacceptable to be implemented,
hence the opportunity given to players to propose shorter term mitigating strategies. Many
solutions of both types are outlined in this report, but one was not favored over the other during
the game because of the lack of clarity on the Arctic strategy for the U.S. If the strategic vision is
that future Arctic operations are to be short-term, ad-hoc, and infrequent in nature, then the
consensus was that temporary, short-term and less formal solutions would be acceptable.
However, if regular deployments, frequent operations, exercises and large scale crisis response
actions were envisioned, then permanent, formal and comprehensive solutions were favored.
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Figure 4. The Relationship between the Types of Solutions and Frequency of Operations
The more frequent or consistent an operation or mission would be conducted, the more suitable
long term proposed solutions were found to be. Conversely, the less frequent or consistent an
operation or mission was executed; the more mitigating strategies or short term solutions were
accepted. Long term solutions tended to be more formalized and structured in nature while the
majority of mitigating strategies were more informal, temporary and less structured.
Additionally, permanent solutions typically were characterized by long development times and a
corresponding need to begin acquisition well before the anticipated need. In the long term, the
described permanent solutions would allow a quicker response time for forces and provide the
requisite capabilities to respond to both an emerging crisis and regular deployment missions.
Accordingly, one player noted, “there needs to be a combination of near term requirement and
near term solutions based on operational requirements; long term approach is able to be phased
based on a solid mission analysis that drives procurement and investments.” Arctic missions are
becoming more likely as noted in this comment: “Arctic Council SAR agreement, now in force,
and its expected oil spill response agreement, would provide reason to send Navy ships up north
and to engage in collaborative exercises.” Additionally, “it was evident in our scenarios (that) we
will be ineffective with our current gaps.”
Further policy guidance pertaining to the USN‟s role and responsibilities in the Arctic was
warranted in developing future short term or long term solutions. “Proposed solutions are costly.
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Therefore, DoD and USN leadership must assess our long term strategy and determine the
priority to operate in the Arctic relative to our other missions and threat assessments. This will
help clarify the investment strategy and prioritize limited resources.”
In summary, deliberation on this issue is driven by “the need to develop an Arctic strategy and
define USN missions and goals in the Arctic over the next 20 years.” The decision to focus on
shorter term solutions or longer term, permanent solutions depended on a strategy which would
identify which type of employment would prevail. This analysis has not yet been completed. In
some cases, the inevitable transition from mitigating strategies to proposed solutions was
described as a phased approach that requires resiliency, patience, and a long term commitment to
cooperation in the region.
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DOTMLPF-P Gaps, Mitigating Strategies and Proposed Solutions
Overview
This game sought to identify gaps in the U.S. Navy‟s ability to conduct sustained maritime
operations in the Arctic region as well as mitigating strategies, and proposed solutions to close
those gaps. This section will describe the gaps identified in the game and provide suggested
mitigating strategies and solutions organized using the DOTMLPF-P construct. The reasoning
behind the selection of the identified gaps, mitigation strategies and solutions will be described
as well.
The overall assessment produced by the game was that the U.S. Navy does not have the means to
support sustained operations in the Arctic. This was due primarily to the lack of appropriate ship
types to operate in or near Arctic ice, the lack of support facilities in the Arctic, and the lack of
sufficient or capable logistics connectors to account for the long logistics distances and lack of
facilities. As noted in Theme 1, these gaps were mitigated or closed through the use of domestic
and international relationships with military and Coast Guard partners which made available
information or capabilities required to support scenario missions. However, the game identified
that many of these relationships and the information and capability requirements that they enable
do not exist or are poorly defined, further exacerbating the materiel issues listed above. These
issues and others surfaced during the game are described in the following pages. Comments in
quotations are reproduced directly from comments or written survey answers provided by players
during the game.
Doctrine
Throughout game play, several key doctrinal gaps affecting the ability to effectively plan or
conduct sustained maritime operations in the Arctic were identified. The lack of guidance
pertaining to command and control relationships among U.S. and international maritime
stakeholders was most notable. This included the lack of a common understanding of the
geographical boundaries, roles and responsibilities and capabilities between nations, U.S.
commandant commanders and the various U.S. numbered fleets. Furthermore, the capabilities,
organization and missions of partner militaries were not well understood, which made
coordination a challenge.
Proposed solutions to these gaps focused on additions to or creation of new doctrine. Fleet level
C2 issues could be resolved through modifications to the Arctic Maritime Response Force
CONOPS as is recommended later in this report. While some C2 relationships between U.S. and
international military and civilian organizations are addressed in AJP 3-1, further clarification is
needed, particularly with regard to the integration of other governmental agencies (OGAs) into
the CTF, particularly this includes non-military agencies from partner nations. Procedures and
supporting MOUs for the integration of these various entities, to include additionally those from
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non-NATO partners, into a C2 organization must be more fully developed and described in AJP
3-1 or a similar document. This is clearly a long term effort, but it is necessary as a critical
enabler to successful international and “whole of government” crisis action response. Looking
further ahead, participants called for development of doctrine in support of a multinational
maritime coordination center and response force in the region. Because significant sensitivities
exist with regard to militarizing the Arctic, there is a need to “keep the military footprint as low
as possible” when developing this coordination center and response force. Accordingly, this
multinational doctrine must focus on information sharing and enhancing cooperation in order to
achieve maritime safety and security in the Arctic.
Other doctrinal shortfalls were identified in the areas of development of awareness regarding
environmental and physical conditions, support to salvage and nuclear incident response in the
Arctic, and management of interactions with Polar Bears and other Arctic wildlife. “The group
had no recollection of extreme cold weather doctrine to support tactical or operational
deployment of naval forces for these scenarios. This doctrinal gap would place a high risk to
accomplishing the mission and to the forces used in this scenario.” Doctrinal guidance
supporting a collective understanding of specific environmental and physical conditions that
impact operations and a fundamental knowledge of specific capable platforms and capabilities
available to perform missions in the Arctic should be developed. The retrieval of nuclear
materials in the Arctic was viewed as an area that requires the development of cooperative
doctrine between Arctic states “in order to increase the probability of success and prevent
international incidents.” Finally, the game identified a need for doctrine regarding ROE and
training for encountering Polar Bears and other wildlife in the Arctic. This should be
accomplished by USFF in the CONOPS. These points should be added to ATP-17 as well as
other USN or joint doctrine.
Organization
Organizational shortfalls were exposed in four areas during this game: USN and joint
relationships, U.S. Whole of Government organization, structures supporting international
cooperation, and structures to support military cooperation with local and regional groups.
Beginning with USN and joint organization, definition and structure were found to be lacking at
the operational level with regard to operational authorities, geographical responsibilities, and
command relationships between U.S. Combatant Commanders, their components and numbered
fleets during operations in the Artic. Recent changes to the Unified Command Plan and relative
inattention to the possibility of conducting operations in the Arctic have added uncertainty to
command arrangements necessary for sustained Arctic Operations. Existing C2 relationships
among U.S. and international maritime forces in the Arctic are still immature, require further
examination, and may not be sufficient to support timely response to missions that require an
immediate USN presence. For example, a need to clarify C2 arrangements between U.S.
NORTHCOM, USFF, PACFLT, and the U.S. Navy‟s 3rd and 6th Fleets was cited, focusing on
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further guidance regarding the roles and responsibilities of each entity, OPCON and TACON
shift points, and information sharing in the Arctic region. Early planning to identify unique or
establish ad hoc relationships was identified as a mitigating strategy.
Current U.S. contingency plans that may require an immediate U.S. “Whole of Government” and
international response in the Arctic, also require further refinement. U.S. interagency structures
to support operational level support to other agencies in the Arctic do not exist or are immature.
On a larger scale, it was seen as likely that the Navy would be requested by another government
to assist in a contingency response scenario resulting a need for rapid assimilation into a
multinational task organization in which a foreign flag officer will command. “Like (with) any
combined operation, establishment and integration of supporting and supported relationships
early on in the planning process is critical.” Similarly, when operating with coalition partners in
the Arctic, naval forces must have the ability to rapidly move and embark special naval units on
partner nation vessels. The long-term solution proposed during the game was to establish a
standing multi-national organization and supporting task force to prepare for Arctic
contingencies. To test and improve this concept, multinational exercises with relevant maritime
stakeholders should be conducted. In any case, clearly defined organizational relationships and
access to strategic locations, resources, and capabilities would support planning of contingency
operations and mitigate risk during their execution. A pre-planned response checklist using this
information and access “would be a valuable tool for planners in Crisis Action Cells.” Similarly,
lessons learned from other multinational and joint contingency operations, such as the Haiti
response, should be leveraged to develop these organizational structures and documents..
Finally, coordinating with key local, state and federal entities in the scenarios presented was
widely recognized as a “substantial organizational gap”. During this game, DoD response in
support of local, state, and federal responders was described in terms of “effectively setting up
conditions that enable rapid ship-to-shore movement of materials in order to execute mission
requirements.” However, this activity depends heavily on local and regional support, which was
found to be lacking. Additionally, the inability of deployed U.S. Naval forces to coordinate and
interact with local indigenous populations emerged as a persistent theme during game play.
Structures which support persistent engagement and communications with tribal leaders
throughout planning and execution in order to gain access to remote areas, better understand the
operational environment, and gain credibility and assurance with the local populace are needed.
Mitigating strategies for these shortfalls centered on the use of Tribal Liaison officers for
community relations and Arctic operations which are maintained by Alaska Command, USCG
District 17 and JTF-Alaska. Additionally, the use of ad hoc Tribal Liaison Officers during PDSS
and operations as well as the establishment of a permanent Tribal Liaison Officer at
NORTHCOM would help mitigate this shortfall.
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Training
All players agreed that the U.S. Navy lacks the experience and knowledge base to currently
operate forces in the Arctic on a year-round basis. Arctic missions require specialized skill sets
which are not currently available in U.S. Navy training pipelines. Specifically cited was a lack of
awareness of how to detect the percentage of ice, fog and wind and how these factors created an
impact on platforms and systems. Another shortfall was the ability to navigate in Arctic waters
and, in particular in austere ports. “U.S. naval officers must have sufficient skill and training to
con their vessels independently of assistance from tugs to enter and leave Arctic ports.” In
general, a lack of sufficient training for operating in the Arctic and, in particular, Arctic-unique
operations was noted. “Our expectation is that the USN is going to the Arctic to do something
other than sit below decks and shoot missiles (most likely some kind of sea-basing). This means
people are going to have to operate small craft and aircraft in extreme cold weather conditions
and those connectors present the highest risk and most vulnerable points of failure.” Other
training deficiencies were identified in the areas of the operation of ship-to-shore connectors, the
movement of heavy equipment and the loading and unloading of cargo during operations in the
Arctic.
The level of knowledge and awareness of NATO or allied national command authorities,
available multinational and industry logistics support hubs, platforms, and points of contact was
found to be inconsistent and a weakness among U.S. Navy personnel. “A clear understanding of
the various regulatory regimes of the sovereign states that ring the Arctic as well as the
international conventions and agreements for planners and operators is essential”.
Accordingly, the need to develop a comprehensive list of training prerequisites in order to
conduct sustained cold weather operations and determine which training should be developed
and maintained within the Department of the Navy was identified. “Future operations in the
Arctic region will not be a primary Area of Operations for USN and will not demand across the
board training for squadrons and ships to add Arctic training to current Training &Readiness
matrices. Rather, ensure a concise NWP or training syllabus exists of surface, helicopter and
fixed-wing assets for Arctic operations." This should include a certification program for
personnel deploying to the Arctic. Additionally it was suggested to develop an Advanced
Qualification Designator (AQD) for Arctic planning and operations. One player noted, “Tracking
officers and enlisted with Arctic experience through the Navy Personnel Command (NPC) data
base would enable Navy leadership to rapidly identify trained and educated personnel, should a
crisis require a U.S. Navy response in the Arctic.” Another recommendation was to leverage
Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group (NAVELSG) as an entity to train and familiarize
personnel with cold weather and ice cargo movement operations. Training in the area of polar
bear mitigation (e.g., requisite equipment and ROE) was emphasized throughout game play and
identified as “a must have for all personnel deploying to the Arctic”. Finally, as noted in the
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CONOPS section of this report, U.S. Navy personnel must be further trained on the specifics of
crisis action response scenarios in Arctic.
While the U.S. Navy does not currently have a significant resource to conduct this training,
leveraging other Arctic nations‟ capabilities was a trend that emerged in many areas including
training to mitigate the lack of current capability. Training (e.g., exercises, workshops, games
etc.) with other international maritime partners must be developed and executed. Specifically, the
U.S. Navy should seek to conduct cooperative training using existing training curriculums and
facilities of Canada, Russia, Denmark, and Norway. “The U.S. Navy needs to take every
opportunity to deploy ships or personnel to the Arctic. This can also be achieved by
participation in Canadian and allied exercises (i.e. NANOOK, or FRONTIER) or by exchanges
where sailors of all trades have an opportunity to sail on other countries' ships”. Additionally,
this game highlighted the interrelationship between the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard. Aside
from leveraging assets and sharing information, players suggested the need to determine and
develop Arctic related training requirements for both services. Additionally, players lacked
fundamental knowledge of existing coordination constructs (e.g., JTF Alaska and Arctic
Council) and responsibilities of domestic organizations (e.g., USN, USCG etc.).
The primary proposal to compensate for the lack of available training among U.S. Navy
personnel regarding Arctic resources for information and specialized capabilities was the
establishment of an Arctic “Center of Excellence.” This center would serve as the focal point for
all matters related to research and training for DON personnel as well as own and manage the
knowledge base for conducting Arctic operations. Acknowledging the wealth of expertise that
exists among the Arctic nations, this center would strive to build relationships and contacts in
order to facilitate the rapid connection of a training or information resource to the command that
needs it. Additionally, cooperative arrangements with civilian universities, industry, and U.S.
and international military universities were also suggested.
Understanding the culture of the local and tribal populaces that inhabit the Arctic was another
area that U.S. Navy personnel lack awareness. Leveraging existing entities such as JTF-Alaska,
D-17, and international partners in order to engage with local tribal leaders was highly
encouraged. The development of long term training syllabus and courses via Navy Knowledge
Online (NKO) or in resident (e.g., similar concept or augment to MSOC) in this area was also
recommended. Maintaining relationships and a network of contacts with the local and indigenous
population in the Arctic should be a focus of the Arctic “Center of Excellence” noted above,
providing an exportable capability to Arctic deployers.
This game also exposed a shortfall in the ability to train personnel in the conduct of
environmental disasters such as oil spills, especially in the context of the Arctic. “DOD lacks an
inherent knowledge of how to handle man-made environmental disasters and is reliant on
commercial and civilian experts and equipment.” Several scenarios required U.S. Navy to
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interact and perform logistics services for these entities. A formalized policy and education plan
to facilitate this interaction was suggested. To address this shortfall in the long term, several
players suggested developing internal DOD personnel with expertise in the area of
environmental spills and cleanup. Additional collaboration with USCG and industry sources
with oil spill containment and clean up experience and integrating key lessons learned into the
CONOPS would greatly enhance USN capabilities in the long run.
Additional shortfalls were identified in the areas of environmental prediction and observation
and in cold-weather survivability. Resources to train ice reconnaissance teams are very limited.
To mitigate this shortfall, the U.S. Navy could utilize Canadian Ice Reconnaissance resources to
assist in providing ice status to augment satellite imagery or embed contracted ice observers in
air detachments. In the long term, the establishment of a training regimen for ice reconnaissance
and navigation teams to augment satellite imagery and train air crews as permanent ice observers
was proposed. With regard to Arctic cold weather survivability training, it was suggested that all
deployed personnel receive pre-deployment training on cold-weather survivability as well as the
use of cold weather gear. As a mitigating strategy, the Navy should leverage industry and
international partner expertise in this area, while long term solutions involved development of a
standing schoolhouse to train personnel on the use of specialized equipment and facilities.
Finally, it was proposed that the lack of a robust onboard repair capability creates significant risk
in an austere environment such as the Arctic. “If a U.S. Naval vessel would sustain a significant
mechanical or electrical casualty while deployed in such a remote and austere environment, they
could be in trouble. At the very least, they will likely need to come off station and return south
to affect repairs. Much of our capability and expertise to effect self-repair is much degraded
relative to 15 or 20 years ago.” This was echoed during another scenario: “A sustained
operation in an austere environment far from logistics hubs requires greater self-sufficiency to
maintain and repair ships, particularly hull and structural systems (especially with a persistent
threat of heavy seas) than currently exists shipboard. (1) Though many ships have capable
machine shops onboard, ship's company lacks needed skills and experience levels to employ
equipment in the course of effecting repairs. (2) S/F has become reliant on fly-away teams for
complex troubleshooting or repairs, IAW a „operator‟ vice „maintainer‟ philosophy as well as
„minimal manning.‟ (3) Following repair of hull structures and systems (electrical or
mechanical), as well as main propulsion, S/F in general lacks training and qualification for
necessary non-destructive testing of repairs.”
Material
Shortfalls in materiel suitable for Arctic service emerged as a primary area of focus during the
game. A key finding of this game is that the U.S. Navy lacks appropriate platforms, equipment,
and communications systems to conduct sustained operations in the Arctic.
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Maritime Vessels
The first identified shortfall is in icebreaking capacity. “Single point failure is the USCG Ice
Breaker HEALY” was a common refrain as nearly every scenario response directed the
immediate deployment of HEALY to the area of interest. In order to mitigate the lack of ice
breaking capability in the near term, players relied heavily on coordination and cooperation with
the USCG, industry and multinational partners. Specifically, throughout the game, these
capabilities were leveraged (leased, borrowed) from both Russia and Canada. These nations‟
proximity to the operating areas and operational experience in the region made this the most
viable and practical solution. Over the long term it was suggested to develop an Arctic
Acquisition Strategy to procure, lease and retrofit ice capable platforms.
Beyond ice breakers, the finding that current warship designs are not robust enough to operate in
even light ice which is already broken was highlighted. In other words, even when escorted by an
icebreaker, transiting the NWP or other areas with more thanclim minimal ice coverage with
amphibious or CRUDES platforms was deemed to be exceedingly risky. Strategic and
operational planners will simply need to accept that certain areas in the Arctic remain off-limits
to U.S. warships unless the commander is willing to accept risks, the ice recedes away from the
area of interest, or ships are produced with additional ice strengthening. As a strategy to mitigate
risk, consultation with NAVSEA engineers and naval architects was determined to be necessary
to offer the commander sufficient understanding of design limitations, but the unpredictability of
ice movement and environmental conditions must also be factored in. Accordingly, the need to
strengthen USN hulls and procure ice breakers, ocean going salvage vessels, and tugs was a
focus throughout the game. The shortfall of available and capable ocean-going dive salvage ships
was area that received significant consideration during gameplay. Leasing these vessels through
industry and multinational partners would mitigate this gap in the near term, while procuring
additional TATF-X vessels was proposed as a long term solution. “If you want Navy presence up
there, we need bigger, better ports with more supplies and ice-classed ships. Ice-class ships
cannot be a retrofit of existing designs. Build new ships whose parameters adhere to a simple set
of rules to achieve classification. These ships are based on empirical information derived from
operating ships in the Arctic environment with minimal infrastructure. This is your best option to
succeed in the mission and mitigate catastrophic failure.”
An additional observation regarding readiness of current vessels for Arctic operations was that
while “most of our ships were originally designed for satisfactory performance in cold or very
cold weather, … maintenance of systems, particularly HVAC, is in general poor condition and
most ships should have a thorough and competent assessment and some level of overhaul and
refit of these systems before deployment to an Arctic environment."
Amphibious ships were highlighted as especially useful for the types of missions anticipated for
the Arctic. “The LPD-17 has a flight deck, hanger and well deck as well as personnel and
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equipment carrying capacity and medical capability.” LCACs were also utilized frequently
during this game as part of the amphibious capability necessary to respond to the various
scenarios provided leading to much discussion on the value of retrofitting existing LCACs. “A
re-fit of our LCACs would work. Doing that, we can at least take some of the effort for SAR and
show a continued presence.” Using another approach, it was noted that “the problem is so
overwhelming with respect to lack of appropriate hulls and infrastructure to support larger hulls
that we probably need to think more out of the box and smaller…getting a smaller vessel with
decent legs such as the Tuuli (Finnish „Arcticized‟ ACV) which has already been tested might
just be the way to go.”
The lack of weather protected surface connectors in lieu of open bay small boat transfer vessels
(LCUs/RHIB) which do not protect personnel from extreme weather conditions was found to be
a limiting factor in mission planning. A mitigating strategy identified included the need to
increase the number of trained boat crews and reduce crew rotation time intervals until such time
that cold weather canopies or heated modules which can provide protection can be developed.
Finally, players asserted that there is insufficient capacity of naval forces to continue current
missions while adding missions, exercises and training in the Arctic with current vessel
inventory.
Aircraft
In order to mitigate the lack of ice capable vessels and ice breaking capability in the near term,
planners were forced to avoid areas where ice accretion was greatest. In these instances, air lift
and air support were relied upon. “A few long range Short Take Off and Landing (STOL)
aircraft would be beneficial in order to utilize the scattered gravel strips in the region and operate
off ship… it would be great to augment this with existing VTOL (shorter range) aircraft”.
However, it was noted that the availability of MV-22s for 6 month deployment would be limited.
To mitigate this shortfall in the near term, players suggested the use of other aircraft, such as H60s despite the range and lift problems attributed to this platform. A proposed solution included
the need to generate requirements for heavy lift, cold-weather capable, vertical lift capable
aircraft.
In order to support air lift and air operations in the Arctic AOR, scenario responses highlighted
the need for the development of airfields in Barrow or Prudhoe Bay to include military hangars
and fuel storage, as well as roads from Fairbanks to the airfields and supply nodes. “Currently,
materiel to support humanitarian relief operations must be drawn from disparate locations and
bases, which in turn increases the response time for the required equipment and supplies to arrive
on scene.” Using airlift capabilities to fly in equipment, personnel, and supplies to a staging area
may decrease the response time to a humanitarian relief event. Utilizing materiel from outside
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organizations (state of Alaska, FEMA, etc.) to compensate for unavailable or prohibitively
distant USN assets was also suggested.
As a final comment, the challenges associated with operating aircraft in the Arctic were
highlighted. “Aircraft in these conditions are inherently more dangerous to operate than ships,
even in good weather. Sustained helicopter and landing craft operations in these conditions, with
all-purpose craft, not specifically designed to operate in these conditions, are going to be very
hazardous for the people and the aircraft." Given the harsh physical and environmental
conditions in the region and lack of capable maritime vessels, the use of unmanned aerial
vehicles for surveillance and distributing resources would be highly applicable and valuable to
supporting operations.
Equipment
The U.S. Navy does not outfit ships with PPE rated for Arctic conditions. The availability of
cold weather equipment and gear for ships and crew rapidly deploying to the Arctic was
highlighted as major materiel gap. To mitigate this shortfall in the near term, a pack-up kit in
fleet concentration area ready for transfer to ships deploying on short notice to the Arctic was
suggested. Test and evaluation processes for Arctic weather gear and AEL requirements must be
established. Procurement of cold weather gear and the development of a ready service locker of
Arctic equipment that is available for unit deploying to the Arctic were also suggested.
Interestingly, one player noted, “At Little Creek Naval Amphibious Base, there is a rotating pool
of gear available for expeditionary operations. You can check out flak jackets, helmets, etc.
Same concept should be applied to cold weather gear.” The limited frequency of use of this
equipment led players to leverage multinational and industry partners in order to acquire
information about best practices for this equipment and for a ready resource for emergency
equipage availability.
Communications
Consistent and reliable communications was identified as another area that lacks sufficient
capabilities. Short-term use of multiple communication methods and accepting reduced
bandwidth were identified as a mitigating strategy. The acquisition of additional polar orbiting
satellites for enhanced communication capabilities was identified as a long term solution.
The ability to conduct satellite surveillance using High Resolution Synthetic Aperture Radar was
another substantial shortfall identified in the game. Purchasing additional high resolution SAR
imagery through commercial companies or using aircraft as remote sensing platforms was
suggested as a mitigating strategy. The acquisition of additional U.S. satellites for SAR and IR
imagery was proposed as a longer term solution.
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Support to Environmental Disaster Response
A lack of knowledge pertaining to oil spill dispersion trajectories under the ice and below the sea
surface was identified. In the near term, players suggested the need to leverage industry and
academia while investment in R&D for developing oil dispersion models was proposed as a long
term solution.
Leadership and Education
The need for strong support from U.S. political leadership for conducting operations in the Arctic
was consistently noted throughout the game despite an observed lack of attentiveness and
understanding among senior U.S. military and civilian leadership on the consequences and risks
associated with the myriad capability gaps identified in this game. The small cadre of military
leaders with significant Arctic knowledge and experience must continue to inform their civilian
counterparts and political leadership on the risks and opportunities of sustained operations of
U.S. maritime forces in the Arctic. Leadership must have the awareness to balance risk to
mission and forces with the costs of capabilities required to mitigate that risk. “The U.S. Navy
needs to have a clearer mandate on what the expected Naval missions will be; increased
education for policy makers with which to better adjudge risk in the Arctic and determine what
costs they are willing to take on in order to increase USN presence.”
Additionally, the game identified a general deficiency of knowledge among senior U.S. Navy
leadership regarding cold weather systems and platforms, climatic conditions, and C2
relationships in the Arctic. Integrating these topics in both junior and senior officer leadership
courses (JPME I & II) as well as the Senior Enlisted Academy was suggested. “The Navy needs
to include Arctic education in CAPSTONE courses, summary of this education to senior staffs,
and Fleet Commander Support for additional T-class ships, native language speakers, and
icebreakers. This would provide knowledge and capability to support increased operations in the
Arctic in the next 30 years.”
Personnel
Insights regarding key personnel gaps, mitigating strategies and proposed solutions have been
integrated within the training, leadership and education categories of this section of the report.
Facilities
The austerity of the infrastructure available to support maritime operations in the Arctic and the
great distances from available support facilities to the actual operating area had a tremendous
impact planning scenario responses and assessing the risks associated with those plans. As was
previously noted, distance and time required for forces to arrive on scene decreased mission
success and the lack of logistics facilities exacerbated this problem. Numerous gaps in logistics
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infrastructure in the region were identified and the ability to support sustained maritime
operations without reliance on extended logistics lines to ports outside the Arctic was questioned.
Additionally, the lack of airports within close proximity to operating areas presented severe
challenges in conducting resupply and air drops of supplies and resources to the local populace,
during HA/DR missions, or to deployed forces. A mitigating strategy proposed during the game
was to use “sister service Air transport into Nome from Elmendorf and leveraging private and
commercial airfields.”
Another aspect of these facilities shortfalls was related to the importance of engagement with the
local communities in the Arctic. A fixed base in the Arctic is needed to maintain continuous
communications and build relationships with indigenous and regional populations and
leadership.
Another conclusion specified that in order to be able to conduct operations for any extended
period of time, logistics support from local authorities, industry and multinational partners is
required. Leveraging logistics facilities in Canada, Iceland, Greenland and Norway as well as
using Thule, Halifax, Nuuk and St. Johns were discussed primarily as mitigating strategies. The
development of permanent logistics infrastructure, Joint FOB‟s, as well as A-PODs and S-PODs
were cited as potential long term solutions. Specifically, infrastructure upgrades at Thule, GL,
Barrow, Ft. Wainright and Nanisivik to support refueling and resupply were identified as key
changes. Thule Air Force Base in the North Star Bay (e.g., Baffin Bay) was discussed as a
location that can provide logistical support in the summer months. Conversely, Resolute was
noted “as a small community that is often blocked by ice even in the summer.”
U.S. support for infrastructure development at Nanisivik was discussed as an example of the
complexities related to relying on non-U.S. Arctic facilities. Nanisivik was described as “a
mining facility with a pier for loading ore and has historically never been a full-featured port…
but has the potential to be refurbished and used for naval resupply.” However, “Nanisivik is not
yet established, and once it is, it will only be for fuel.” In the end, “Nanisivik Naval Facility is
intended partially to emphasize Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. U.S. involvement might
entail resolution or mitigation of the U.S.-Canadian sovereignty dispute over the status of
Canadian internal waters and international strait in the Northwest Passage region. However,
U.S. resources could meaningfully enhance the development of the facility and Canada might be
persuaded on that basis.”
Policy
A lack of policy guidance regarding coordination and collaboration with multinational military
forces (e.g., Canada, Denmark, Norway, Greenland, Finland and Russia) in support of Arctic
operations was a prominent concern throughout game play. Specifically, the importance of
Russian and U.S. relations and the need to develop U.S. policy towards working with Russian
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maritime forces in the Arctic in the form of MOUs, bi-lateral and multilateral agreements in
support of future cooperation and collaboration was emphasized. The primary areas identified to
facilitate this include: participation in joint multinational exercises and the sharing of training,
logistics facilities, and information. Efforts to mitigate short term crisis responses (e.g.
environmental spill, natural disaster etc.) were noted as the most likely mission areas for
cooperation.
Additionally the lack of guidance regarding U.S. and Canadian C2 arrangements in the Arctic
region was significant. Given the scenarios encountered during the game, the U.S. and Canada
should have identified a need to “trade off responsibilities” between each other in various
operating areas and missions encountered and shared by both nations. Within this construct the
importance of identifying and respecting the boundaries of authority and jurisdiction for Arctic
operations. The establishment of clear boundaries within which combined operations could be
conducted under Canadian leadership and authority (e.g., specifically between Resolute and
Sachs Harbor) was suggested. In the long term, players suggested developing a bilateral or
multilateral agreement or policy similar to the Maritime Operations Threat Response (MOTR)
process to guide decisions on lead agencies for Arctic operations.
A recurring theme was the significant lack of guidance pertaining to how U.S. maritime forces
(e.g., USN and USCG) are integrated into a “U.S. Whole of Government” response effort in the
Arctic. Concerns were cited regarding the uncertainty of “On Scene Commander Expeditionary
Politics when conducting salvage operations close to other nation‟s territorial waters” and the
need for a “specifically whole of government integration.” A need to “Identify processes to
request support from foreign governments and other U.S. Government Agencies from a whole of
government approach.” was also cited. Emphasizing the importance of an integrated national
approach to HA/DR or other crisis response missions, it was claimed that “Whole of
Government (e.g., emphasized by Canada and a topic in the U.S.) or Whole of Governments
should be more readily acceptable to the Navy and DoD." Other comments highlighted the
uncertainties perceived in the policy guidance regarding lead agencies for various events, or the
accessibility of other government assets in the case of a crisis. “We need to have an indication
that direction on the military response to a maritime domestic event such as this oil spill will
come from U.S. NORTHCOM.” This lack of policy guidance also includes the other military
services, JTF-Alaska, and local, state and federal agencies as well as NGO‟s and the commercial
sector. Furthermore, “There are many capabilities to sustain operations in the Arctic, but they
are underutilized due to the lack of guidance and requirements to properly focus and integrate the
capabilities in such a way as to inform decision makers and policy development.”
Additional policy recommendations centered on the resolution of policy gaps regarding
environmental protection and other factors related to interacting with the natural state of the
Arctic. One issue identified was the need for ROE for mitigation of Polar Bears and other
wildlife. Another related concept was that maritime forces need to be given policy guidance to
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govern how strict environmental regulations in large portions of the navigable Arctic can be
addressed. “Sensitivity to environmental regulations in the Arctic is far greater than we
experience anywhere else and if our policy to comply with or ignore is an afterthought decision
we will lose the jury of the public. We need to decide what we will do and then deliberately plan
the solutions and strategic communications to support or mitigate that. Thus, strategic
communications needs to be at the forefront of planning operations to understand „how our
presence looks from the other side‟, one player said.” This realization throughout the game
encouraged the identification of the need for further policy related to the discharge of waste and
disposal of trash from ships in the region. However, it is noteworthy that “a policy for USN to
abide by all HN and international regulations will prevent putting most ships in the AOR.”
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Updates to Arctic Maritime Response Force CONOPS
This section provides an overview of the main themes that the players identified for improving
the Arctic Maritime Response Force CONOPS. The analysis team utilized a grounded theory
approach whereby themes were identified through a process of constant comparison and then
tested throughout the data. Moreover, the relevance of the themes was determined by linking the
themes to the Navy‟s Arctic Road Map and Arctic Maritime Response Force Concept of
Operations. This method attempts to explore both documents and inform leaders of the major
challenges and solutions players encountered when planning sustained maritime operations in the
Arctic. Comments in quotations are reproduced directly from comments or written survey
answers provided by players during the game.
Structural Changes and Overview
Overall, the Arctic Maritime Response Force CONOPS was identified to be a valuable tool to
support sustained maritime operations in the Arctic. However, the Atlantic Coast centric
approach to the Arctic and focus on war fighting missions and missions with long planning
opportunities of the CONOPS was inadequate to meet the most likely missions specified in the
Arctic Roadmap. Accordingly, it should be modified to support operations in both of the
Atlantic and Pacific Fleets as well as a wider range of operations to include crisis action planning
and crisis response.
Given that the original CONOPS was developed by COMSECONDFLT, its Atlantic focus is
natural. But, discussions during the game made clear that what works in one region cannot be
automatically applied in other regions. Entering the Arctic from the Pacific has a number of
significant differences to include changes to C2 procedures to account for interactions between
EUCOM, NORTHCOM and PACOM or USFF, PACFLT and the various numbered fleets, the
presence of sovereign U.S. territory in the form of Alaska, the corresponding reduction in the
criticality of international partnerships, and finally, the existing organization and networking of
USCG District 17 and JTF Alaska. For the CONOPS to be broadly accepted and implemented,
these factors must be taken into account. A common comment was: “Change the CONOPS to
reflect the bias to more of operating in the U.S. Arctic vice the Atlantic Arctic.”
Other discussions emphasized that likely missions and scenarios that would require a DOD
response consisting of “emergent tasking/crisis action planning in the Arctic.” Suggestions
included adding information and planning tools on crisis action planning for emergency
contingencies, better aligning the document with the Arctic Roadmap. The CONOPS requires a
careful review of the missions and what the “U.S. Navy shall, should, or could do in the Arctic.”
Additionally, the original CONOPS seemed to be written for combat or transit vice sustained
operations. There is “a need for more comprehensive vignettes outlining basic considerations for
crisis response for man-made natural disasters.” For example, “add an oil spill vignette in
CONOPS to include decontamination of equipment, personnel (as per industry), and PPE.
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Include procedures on special Arctic restrictions, or resources/references for these special
procedures.”
Correspondingly, it was found that the CONOPS was inconsistent in its guidance regarding
missions for an AMRF or sustained operations in the Arctic. The scope of missions listed in the
CONOPS appeared to be focused predominantly on war-fighting instead of the more likely
scenarios of DOD support and response to emergent contingencies. The original document
concentrated on deliberate planning and timelines, and less on crisis action planning (CAP).
During the game, courses of action were repeatedly developed that required many assets and
services to be deployed and activated on an accelerated basis instead of the months of lead time
assumed in the existing CONOPS. To correct this, a crisis action planning section for emergency
contingencies should be added into the CONOPS. An abbreviated planning process associated
with a crisis action planning timeline similar to the Global Fleet Station (GFS) planning timeline
used as an example in the original CONOPS was suggested. The Office of Response and
Restoration (NOAA) provides comprehensive information on responding to a natural resource
crisis which could serve as a framework. Additionally, the CONOPS should include more CAP
vignettes, such as the disaster response, oil spill, or Homeland Security scenarios developed for
this game.
Many of the CONOPS changes recommended by game participants pertained to subjects that
were already largely addressed in the original document. However, it was believed that the
subject matter was inconsistently written, not intuitively organized or needed additional
amplification. Organizing the information to more closely align with joint planning doctrine and
amplifying pertinent information would improve the CONOPS. For example, in the “Planning
and Execution” section, reorganizing topics by joint operational function would help planners to
fully integrate the CONOPS into their plans.
Finally, players cautioned against too many additions to the CONOPS. “Keep the CONOPS
operational and put tactical elements into the ATP; there was a tendency not to make full use of
other publication formats (Shipboard pubs and guidance (Cold Weather Bills, deployment
guidance), AT/FP, and ONI assessments; reference to these would help keep the CONOPS
focused on its intended use.” Suggested revisions to the CONOPS should be crosschecked with
existing doctrine or publications to prevent duplication; referring to and referencing the location
where the needed information could be found would be sufficient.
Command and Control
The Arctic region is characterized by unique AOR boundaries as well as unique, ill-defined or
newly established organizational relationships at and between all levels of command. This
creates situations where planners do not fully understand command relationships or where all
interactions are based on different ad hoc relationships. A contributing factor to this problem is
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that Arctic Maritime Response Force C2 procedures are not adequately addressed in the
CONOPS. The CONOPS should address the unusual nature of C2 in the Arctic, specifically in
resolving AOR overlaps and boundaries as well as unique and unusual command interactions
(such as COMTHIRDFLT operating in the NAVEUR/EUCOM AORs). Other updates should
include descriptions of relationships between USFF and PACFLT, LANTAREA and
PACAREA, and Canada‟s JTF-North. The CONOPS should include a chapter or an appendix
illustrating and defining existing C2 relationships and authorities which would provide a
standardized reference for routine transit or contingency mission planning. Finally, the process of
refining the CONOPS should also support refinement of the C2 relationships in the region, and,
as such, should be a fully collaborative process with all levels of command represented.
Another area of improvement identified is in the CONOPS‟ description of communications. This
was not examined in great detail during the game due to classification restrictions, but it was
noted that the inclusion of a standard or strawman communications plan would be beneficial to
planners and operators. This is especially valuable because unique communications systems are
required for Arctic sustainability which are not part of communications packages in other AORs.
This includes leveraging commercial or partner systems which may require system modifications
and which may come with limitations with regard to bandwidth or ability to carry classified
information. This communications plan should address the “Arctic communications limitations,
specifically the SATCOM footprint, and the corresponding impact to command and control.”
A recurring theme in the game was that C2 and command relationships in the Arctic region must
be clearly resolved and articulated early in the planning process. The seams in coalition C2,
CCDR and numbered fleet boundaries, and in partnerships and roles between interagency
organizations, federal-state, and government and non-governmental agencies discussed above
create significant additional effort for a planning staff. The CONOPS should highlight this factor
and call for staffs to begin C2 planning as early as possible, perhaps with the development of
preplanned C2 and communications packages for use in the event of a crisis.
Partnerships and Relationship Building
Throughout the game, the need to conduct operations in the Arctic in a cooperative manner due
to limitations in any one nation's capabilities was emphasized. The CONOPS should include
guidance on standing relationships with Arctic partners as well as the procedures for starting an
ad hoc relationship in support of a crisis response operation. Strong maritime partnerships are
critical to the ability to operate in the Arctic. Most Arctic nations are also members of NATO
and “an appendix with data on NATO procedures” should be included in the CONOPS to
facilitate the rapid establishment of C2 in the event of a crisis. The “CONOPS needs to expand
and emphasize the potential need for international cooperation to conduct Arctic operations”
along with detailed policy guidelines on C2 relationships. The process of requesting support
from Arctic nation and partners, specifically Canada, Norway, and the Kingdom of Denmark,
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must be provided in an annex along with liaison points of contact (POC) information. Players
even went so far as to recommend that “a standing task force for multi-national operations
should be established with Arctic nations to address standard C2 relationships
(OPCON/TACON, etc.).” It is strongly recommended that the CONOPS provide guidance on
using “subject matter experts (SME) as liaison officers to involved organizations” including local
communities.
As with all operations, strategic communications are important. Due to the sensitive nature of
operating in the Arctic, it is imperative that commanders get the strategic communication right
and that it is consistent. The U.S. Navy wants to send the correct message of why the military is
operating in the Arctic. In line with this approach, it was recommended to delete CONOPS
sections focused on war fighting. Further, guidance is required on conducting military operations
that requires the use of lethal fires that prevent adversaries from scuttling ships that conduct
illegal activities. The cumulative effects of these instances would adversely impact the
ecologically sensitive Arctic region and send a negative message to Arctic partners.
It was also recognized that the nature of maritime operations would always be influenced by
"whose Arctic" the operations would be occurring within. Significant geographical,
meteorological, geopolitical, and infrastructure differences exist between the Arctic sub-regions.
For example, from the U.S. perspective, the presence of Alaska greatly changes the character of
Arctic operations when compared to other sub-regions. In almost every other case, a strong
relationship with the nearest Arctic nation to the planned operating area is essential to the
sustainment of forces and the cooperative response to the planned operation by interested
neighbors.
Numerous interested parties beyond the five Arctic Nations were also described. These included
U.S. and coalition forces, interagency organization and other government agencies (OGAs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the local population. Prior to and during operations in
the Arctic, planners and operators must understand all of these entities and the CONOPS should
include descriptions of key stakeholders, their interest areas, and their capabilities. Additionally,
these entities could be the key to a variety of specialized Arctic assets which exist and may be
utilized, but staffs may not be aware of their capabilities or even their existence. Planners should
consider that a partner, NGO, or civilian industry organization may have better capabilities to
execute certain missions or tasks. It was recommended that the CONOPS include “an Annex
addressing liaison points of contact for Arctic partner nations and actors (NGOs, IGOs,
contractors, etc.)”
The CONOPS should provide guidance on the procedure to solicit support from U.S.
government agencies given the engagement nature of many Arctic missions. CONOPS changes
must include descriptions of multiple U.S. government agencies and capabilities that have a
stake in the Arctic such as the National Incident Management System (NIMS). “Maritime
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Operational Threat Response Plan should be considered as one process to facilitate the U.S.
Whole of Government response to Arctic issues/responses.”
The listing of the Arctic‟s key leaders and their primary points of contact from the various
organizations and indigenous people as well as an understanding of their interrelationships must
be understood to support PDSS efforts. There is a requirement to successfully engage with Arctic
region native populations that requires support from several entities that already have established
relationships such as the U.S. Coast Guard (District -17), other Arctic nations (Canada, Kingdom
of Denmark, Russia), and JTF-N in order to have a greater chance of understanding and
cooperation.
The environmental sensitivities associated with operating in the Arctic with ships required to
adhere to the “leave no trace” principle requires the development of specific guidance and
procedures associated with sustained maritime operations in this area. As noted elsewhere in this
report, the U.S. Navy needs to determine a policy with regard to compliance to the various
environmental and operating regulations that exist in large portions of the navigable Arctic for
both forces operating today and those currently being developed and procured. This policy
should be included in the CONOPS. In support of this policy, the CONOPS should include
information on special Arctic restrictions with listed resources and references as well as guidance
on how to “adhere to the environmental & wildlife considerations/ regulations of the Arctic
coastal state.” Additionally, include a section that provides guidance and procedures for the
discharge of various types of waste and the need “to hold/store waste for extended periods.”
Other suggested solutions include the option of discharging waste to other ships for further
transport for proper disposal.
Movement and Maneuver
Throughout the game it was noted that harsh and variable environmental conditions and large
distances will likely create uncertainty in planning, timeliness and timing, and can create
conditions which exceed current operational capabilities. This uncertainty should be understood
and taken into account when planning. To reduce this uncertainty, an appendix with a “GO/NO
GO criteria chart of ice operations (Air, Surface, and Subsurface operations)” was suggested.
“Arctic winter SMEs should be consulted on developing go/no-go criteria, assessing system
limitations, etc. if we are considering winter operations in the Arctic.” The “CONOPS should
identify the environmental (ship) threshold beyond which we are really standing into danger.
Kind of like the limits we establish on aircraft and landing craft operations. We know what risk
we are taking based on established limits and calculations. Then we determine if we can do it.”
Guidance must be provided that clearly defines the length of time or thresholds a ship which is
not ice rated or designed for Arctic operations can safely remain in the Arctic to inform planners
and operators that “there is also no defined amount of ice that non hardened ship can operate in.”
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It was recognized that no chart could be comprehensive, but that a quick reference guide would
be necessary given the lack of Arctic experience and knowledge resident in the force.
A recurring theme throughout the game was that the U.S. Navy‟s ability to operate in the Arctic
under a wide variety of ice and weather conditions is limited and operators must understand the
design limitations of aircraft and surface warships. Shipboard design challenges include material
limitations associated with hull construction, various shipboard equipment limitations due to
Arctic conditions frequently exceeding design limits (sub-zero weather environments), and
propulsion and auxiliary equipment designs that do not incorporate measures that prevent sea
chests from becoming blocked by sea ice. The CONOPS section covering U.S. Navy “platform
selection criteria should be prioritized and is missing key factors such as sustainability and ice
(capability)” that best support mission accomplishment. Planners need a table that lists the ice
capabilities of all major classes of USN/USCG/USNS/MSC/MARAD ships. This table should
contain “the major plus and minus of each class (i.e. a DDG has exposed screws and bow
mounted sonar prone to ice damage.” It was also suggested that the CONOPS should “add an
appendix explaining Ship Ice Ratings to highlight capabilities and limitations.” Modification and
expansion are also required in the existing “Platform Section” (CONOPS p. 24) to include
information on ice breaker and salvage vessels and alternative resource options such as leasing
assets from Arctic nations or private industry (see also the discussion on U.S. Navy Contracting
procedures later in this report).
Similarly, there needs to be a section on the challenges of operating the airborne assets that
provide logistical support and intelligence gathering in terms of the acceptable risk level
associated with extreme cold weather, visibility, maintenance support, and transient basing.
Players were often surprised by unforeseen limitations in aircraft capabilities that were unknown
to the operators, but were well known to engineers or acquisition personnel.
In the case of smaller vessels, several aspects of Arctic operations create unique circumstances
with regard to ship-to-shore movement and surface connector operations. These include typical
shoreline and bottom characteristics, varying ice composition, and reduced exposure times for
vessel crew which prompted a suggestion that procedure to mitigate the impact of these factors
be included in the CONOPS. Also required is “amplifying guidance for cold weather impacts to
personnel similar to what is contained in USCG/CAN/KoD publications (Safe stay time charts
etc.).” The inclusion of cold weather operations information (or reference to the appropriate
document) specifically tailored for surface connectors such as LCAC, LCUs, and other U.S.
Navy craft would benefit planners and operators.
The CONOPS should reflect the requirement for all units to make accommodations for cold
weather operations. Details for these changes are spread throughout numerous technical manuals
and the like, but should be assembled and summarized into a reference guide or checklist.
Examples include requirements to change lubrication or modify operating procedures for cold or
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icy weather. The inclusion of a “list technical references that provide the detailed maintenance
practices required to operation critical equipment in the Arctic/extreme cold weather” was
suggested.
Because of the specific requirements associated with Arctic operations and the rarity of actual
Arctic deployments, it was recommended that the CONOPS establish a structure to preselect
units to serve as the AMRF either on a planned or crisis action basis. “A squadron or specific
hulls need to be identified for AMRF instead of using the entire fleet as a pool for Arctic
response.” This smaller pool of units would be the focus for the training and materiel solutions
outlined elsewhere in this report. This was recommended as a way to mitigate the risk of Arctic
operations. “These deployed assets are self-sufficient for operating in austere, remote
environments where potential is much higher for damage to ship's systems and equipment than in
normal operating environments. (And you are much farther from help than we have grown
accustomed to.)”
For example, in the case of ice navigation, there are specific training requirements and materiel
solutions that would need to be implemented for potential Arctic deployers. Instead of spreading
these across the fleet, identifying a smaller pool of units would be more cost-effective. In any
case, the CONOPS needs to provide detailed guidance to ships operating in various sea ice
conditions placing emphasis on ice navigation and the associated risks of operating in sea ice
laden waters given current ship designs. The CONOPS should include a comprehensive
description of sea ice navigation issues given the fleet‟s responsibility to “man, train, and equip
U.S. Navy ships to navigate around or avoid the ice, or provide an ice breaking capability if we
intend to operate in areas constantly covered with ice.” Suggested references include the
“Canadian Coast Guard web site and search the Ice Navigation Guide. Also look at the
Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention act for guidance on ship/ice operations.” Finally,
the CONOPS should outline training standards and certification requirements for ice navigation
personnel, both resident within the crew or hired for a specific voyage.
Logistics
Arctic infrastructure is austere and extended logistics chains are vital to operating in the Arctic.
Due to this, logistics must be planned well in advance. Ports in the region maintain minimal onhand stores and the long-lead times required to order and deliver fuel or materiel to the region
can quickly place a fleet logistics planner in extremis and severely limit the options available to
planners and commanders. Additionally, economy of effort is a key to success as whatever
forces are operating in the Arctic must be supported from outside.
Logistics operations in the Arctic present several unique scenarios and conditions. The CONOPS
should present a strawman logistics plan or an overview of logistics plans for operations in the
various regions of the Arctic which should be maintained at the fleet level. As part of this, the
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CONOPS should contain an annex that provides a comprehensive listing of Arctic APODs and
SPODs with detailed information on each site‟s capabilities to include the type of available
logistic support for U.S. military forces. This annex should also contain information on the
preferred lines of communication for each likely operating area in the Arctic. As these lines of
communication will be very long, planners must always keep the availability of CLF ships in
mind, as they can be a limiting factor. Additionally, the CONOPS should provide planners with
enough information to successfully “explore pre-configured logistics packages to support small
salvage ships when Combat Logistic Force (CLF) support is not available.” Due to the lack of
Arctic shore infrastructure and the potential to quickly strain shore side resources, the
“knowledge of shore side capabilities is just as important to planning as knowledge of maritime
capabilities.” Because of the lack of shore infrastructure, the CONOPS should address
procedures to pre-position logistics assets in preparation for planned or crisis action
deployments. Finally, logistics is an area in the original draft CONOPS document that is
characterized by deliberate planning and long planning horizons. This should be modified to
address crisis situations more thoroughly. The CONOPS should include crisis action
vignettes/scenarios that reflect the difficulty of operating so far from existing logistics hubs in
bad weather.” Another related issue is that ship husbandry contracts must typically be arranged
6-8 months in advance in order to permit materiel, supplies and fuel to be delivered prior to the
ship‟s arrival. The CONOPS should address this need and explore methods to expedite
arrangements for husbandry in the case of a crisis.
Related to this, the issue of Arctic operations requiring long lead times for logistical support
coordination and the importance of using PDSS visits for overall coordination was highlighted.
There is the potential for circumstances to delay and thus extend timelines associated with crisis
and emergent contingencies. It was suggested that PDSS for ports or airfields likely to be utilized
in crisis response operations should be regularly visited and their PDSS information updated to
reduce delays in deploying into the Arctic. In support of this, a list of military and USCG
installations and associated seaport and airfield information needs to be provided in an easy to
use reference list that provides basic capability information.
The CONOPS should provide detailed guidance on emergency procedures such as a medical
evacuation (MEDEVAC) that requires prior coordination. Guidance is required on emergency
medical capabilities and the medical compliment necessary to medically support the force in this
remote region. This should include information on embarked medical forces not normally
required during International Contingency Operations (ICO) due to Arctic conditions and the
need to embark earlier in the operation due to extended distances between operating areas and
suitable APODs.
U.S. Navy forces do not normally operate in the Arctic and these units must be supported by
equipment pack up kits (PUK) that can be quickly transported to the deploying unit during a
crisis response situation. These kits contain PPE and other cold weather support items not
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normally carried onboard naval units. The CONOPS should define the composition of the PUKs,
the procedures for transferring them to deploying units and the responsible organizations for
maintaining them. Players called for a revamping the entire section on materiel concerns
associated with clothing requirements (CONOPS pages 31-33) and a comprehensive PPE list
with AELs appropriate for Arctic weather conditions. Additionally, the CONOPS should direct
fleet logistics planners to work with the Navy Supply System to identify and procure appropriate
specialized equipment (see above discussion regarding Pack Up Kits (PUK)). As a last point on
this subject, alternative fuel considerations and associated guidance need to be included in the
CONOPS. For example, tasks and plans developed during the game had elements that required
the use of unleaded gasoline (MOGAS) which is carried in very limited quantities on U.S. Navy
ships. U.S. Navy ships may be requested to stow and support various operations that require the
use of MOGAS. Similarly, alternative lubricants suitable for cold weather operations may be
required and should be identified for possible inclusion in the PUK.
A positive factor for Arctic logistics is the large and increasing industry and exploration presence
in the Arctic. Planners should attempt to leverage industry capabilities such as ice hardened
designed ships that are already positioned in the Arctic and operated by an experienced
workforce. “The most capable and readily available assets may already be in the AOR but are
privately owned.” The CONOPS should be updated to leverage commercial solutions in areas
such as communications, logistics, and specialized vessels such as dive support, salvage, towing,
or logistics support. The CONOPS needs to outline an approved procedure or identify the
contracting authority to lease ice hardened vessels that are capable of salvage, tug operations,
and ice breaking activities. “The most critical update of the CONOPS will be to take the
CONOPS from a transient type focus to more of long-term sustained operation focus. This will
include thorough examination of the logistics requirements. Additionally, given the Arctic has a
vast supply of natural resources a focus should be on our interaction with industry and making
sure our equipment/systems can interface with theirs.”
Finally, because of the need to self-support logistically, adhere to environmental restrictions, and
to retrograde any material brought into the Arctic, it was determined that planners should strive
for as small a footprint as possible. Specifically, each operation should be completed with as few
ships, aircraft, and personnel as possible. The CONOPS should emphasize that planners must
minimize the operational human footprint in order to reduce required logistical support and
retrograde requirements while limiting the environmental impact of the operation.
Knowledge and Training
Arctic operations will likely require tailored pre-deployment training and access to in-depth
information and analysis on a broad range of topics. These include environmental protection,
relations with local and indigenous peoples, operating with coalition partners, fundamental
shiphandling, and understanding meteorological conditions.
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Some relief to this challenge was proposed by those who described disparate nodes of Arctic
expertise and called for the CONOPS to include a catalog of them in support of planning
activities. “The CONOPS needs to provide better information concerning already existing Arctic
centers of expertise concerning ice and weather forecasting. Secondly the CONOPS needs to
provide a better understanding of existing Navy and Coast Guard facilities and Command and
Control of other Arctic Nations in order to facilitate planning for Arctic Operations.” “Add an
Appendix / Annex with resources for key Arctic elements such as the National Ice Center,
International Ice Patrol, FNMOC, etc.” Players identified that a “Center of Excellence” should be
developed to maintain and coordinate all of these relationships, noting that it could be a very
small staff element which focused on Arctic relationships, non-Navy capabilities and issues.
Were such a “Center of Excellence” to be developed at the Fleet level, its organization and
functions should be described in the CONOPS.
There needs to be “clearer guidance to utilize and leverage the U.S. Navy‟s Lesson Learned
database and personnel.” The lack of U.S. Navy Arctic corporate knowledge, ice capable assets,
and Arctic experience has created a vast knowledge gap which could be closed by the capture of
numerous lessons learned in the Navy‟s Lessons Learned database. The lessons learned must
also incorporate “lessons learned from academia, partner nations, industry” and this database
“needs to reflect real world experiences in the Arctic environment from a broad group of experts
(international, national, and academia.).” These insights should be incorporated into the
CONOPS. The CONOPS should direct all levels of command to use the Navy Lessons Learned
process to seek out knowledge from the broadly available non-Navy expertise and to feed this
knowledge back into the lessons learned system. The CONOPS should also include a mechanism
for regular review of lessons learned and revision of the CONOPS itself.
There are numerous Arctic-specific areas where specialized training is needed to support safe,
sustained operations. The CONOPS should describe and define crew training standards for ships
or aircrew deploying to the Arctic. Because this remains a rare event, these standards would not
need to be maintained for all ships, but only for the selected few likely to operate there. This
description should include Navy or non-Navy sources for required training in support of both
deliberate or crisis action timelines. “The organizations (organic or DOD contracted) providing
this training would have the subject matter expertise to prepare units to operate in the Arctic.”
In a similar vein to the ice navigation training mentioned in the Movement and Maneuver section
of this chapter, a need for U.S. Navy training implementation on ice familiarization and
identification training for shipboard personnel was repeatedly identified, METOC detachments,
and air surveillance personnel to perform ice recognition, monitoring, identification and
prediction duties. The CONOPS should outline non-Navy sources for this expertise in support of
crisis response as well as training standards to include guidance on the level of ice navigation
training required before operating in the Arctic.
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Another specialized skill in support of sustaining Arctic operations is linguistics. It was
recommended that the CONOPS clearly define the need for embarked linguist support in the
various regions of the Arctic. This section should also specify the languages needed for various
regions as well as sources for non-Navy expertise in these fields. An embarked linguistic
capability enhances the ability to quickly interact with other Arctic nations or indigenous groups
to ensure timely coordination.
Planners and operators supporting Arctic operations need to know a common language. The
CONOPS should include a section of terms and definitions associated with the Arctic
environment and associated operations to ensure clarity of understanding. An example of a
common misunderstanding is the definition of “ice-free” conditions. “It should be clear when
and in what conditions the operation is expected to be conducted.” Similarly, the CONOPS
should have a regularly updated appendix containing links to databases and a listing of
publications that supports U.S. Navy units in preparing for and conducting operations in the
Arctic environment. If an Arctic “Center of Excellence” were to be established, then this section
should be maintained in collaboration with it.
Another useful addition to the CONOPS would be a strawman Arctic ISR plan. This could serve
both as the starting point for actual operational plans and as an example to educate planners on
the unique aspects of and resources available for Arctic ISR. This plan would support various
CONOPS missions such as Maritime Domain Awareness, oil recovery efforts, and HA/DR
operations. “The CONOPS should cover in greater detail, a plan to do sustained ISR as a
combined effort with international partners. This pertains to collection on ice coverage,
changing weather conditions, oil dispersion, etc.” The plan should address proper positioning of
limited ISR resources and the possibility of combining ISR efforts with international partners
using Thule AFB as a coordination node.
Important considerations for planners and operators preparing to send forces into the Arctic are
the sensitivities associated with disturbing indigenous wildlife while operating in the Arctic.
Wildlife migrations take place at sea, on land, and in the air. Operations in this environment
should not normally adversely impact wildlife and the indigenous people who live and depend on
these food sources. A comprehensive Arctic marine mammal/wildlife guide of historic hunting
grounds as well as contact listings to determine the latest information on the current hunting
ground locations is a prerequisite to Arctic operations. Either this information or reliable
references which can be used to obtain it should be incorporated into the CONOPS. Arctic
deployers must also be prepared to deal with the dangers of indigenous wildlife such as polar
bears. Specialized Force Protection training, policy, rules of engagement and procedures to
protect forces from this wildlife should be included in the CONOPS. It was suggested that
planners coordinate with indigenous populations and First Nation Rangers for local expertise and
as a force protection security resource.
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A complete understanding of the characteristics of the Arctic environment needs to be available
in a CONOPS appendix providing detailed oceanographic information, seasonal ice conditions,
and weather data to support extended Arctic operations. This appendix should address the
“corresponding assumption of risk as it pertains to intelligence preparation of the environment.”
This is especially important in terms of operating in the vicinity of Arctic ice. Arctic ice
conditions are dynamic and the addition of an ice appendix containing guidance and information
such as ship ice rating matrix with associated capabilities, ice navigation information, and
procedures for operating in sea ice would provide the necessary resources supporting operations
in the Arctic environment. The ice appendix would provide Arctic seasonal information, various
types of sea ice characteristics, reference links, and a listing of organizations providing weather
forecasting, oceanographic, and hydrographic information. Example organizations include “the
National/Navy Ice Center for ice remote sensing and ice charts, and Fleet Numerical
Meteorology and Oceanography Center (FNMOC) for numerical weather and ice forecasts.”
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
In focusing on the specific gaps that limit sustained operations in the Arctic region, players
sought to identify specific recommendations that USFF should consider when planning or
conducting operations in the Arctic. The following recommendations are characterized by their
potential for immediate impact at the operational level and the feasibility of near-term
implementation. The major DOTMLPF-P actions USFF should develop and implement are:
establish USFF Arctic Working Group; update CONOPS and applicable doctrine to reflect game
insights; deploy to the Arctic; build domestic and international relationships; develop and
manage lessons learned database; and pursue identified areas for further research. These are
summarized here with details provided earlier in the report .
Establish USFF Arctic Working Group or Arctic “Center of Excellence”
Develop a permanent working group within USFF to manage and facilitate all maritime planning
and operations associated with the Arctic. The core of this group would be a small group with the
primary duty of establishing and maintaining a corporate knowledge of Arctic matters. This
entity‟s primary focus would be to create resources to rapidly identify and consult with U.S. and
international entities in order to improve operational readiness for U.S. Naval forces and
personnel. This would serve as a necessary first step toward establishing a permanent liaison
entity with other U.S. and international Arctic stakeholders. Specifically, this entity would be
responsible for: coordinating and conducting research projects, workshops and seminars;
collaborating with Navy, Joint, interagency, and industry as well as multinational stakeholders at
the operational level; integrating lessons learned into applicable doctrine; coordinating with Task
Force Climate Change; managing and disseminating all information pertaining to the Arctic at
the operational level; tracking U.S. Navy Arctic expertise and experience; and ensuring the Navy
is adequately manned, trained and equipped for Arctic operations.
Other roles would include managing networking with indigenous communities in the Arctic and
leverage similar efforts performed by USCG District 17, Canada‟s JTF North, JTF-Alaska or the
like. In the case of Arctic deployments or exercises, this group would push fundamental required
information to the force and then respond to pull requests as needed, acting as a research support
activity for deployed forces. Finally, this group would be responsible for revising the CONOPS.
It is recommended that this group serve as the support hub for all U.S. Navy Arctic activities
until such time that Arctic deployments or exercises become much more common than they are
today.

52

Fleet Arctic Operations Game Report
Update CONOPS to Reflect Game Insights
This should be executed by the Arctic Working Group discussed above and should include all
operational level stakeholders (NAVEUR, PACFLT, C3F, C6F) with participation by
NORTHCOM, EUCOM and PACOM.
Deploy to the Arctic
During game play, it was repeatedly suggested that “The best way to gain expertise and
experience in the region is to deploy forces to the Arctic”. Accordingly, USFF should
periodically deploy a ship to the Arctic for a sustained period to gather lessons learned and
conduct COMREL with indigenous population. Coordination with USCG and multinational
forces to conduct refueling and resupply should also be considered during deployment.
Build Relationships
Working to improve cooperation with multinational partners (e.g., Canada, Russia, Demark,
Norway and Greenland) in the areas of information sharing, training and platform acquisition
should be a priority. This should include efforts to develop bilateral and multilateral agreements
with these nations in order to leverage capacities, resources and information. In order to foster
long term partnerships with relevant multinational maritime forces and develop operational
experience in the Arctic, USFF should position Arctic exchange officers on Canadian, Russian,
Norwegian and Danish ships as feasible. Additionally, regular and frequent exercises should also
be conducted among Arctic nations‟ maritime forces in order to explore interoperability
challenges and capability deficiencies. Similarly, USFF should spearhead efforts to build
relationships within the U.S. Navy (PACFLT, NAVEUR) and across the U.S. government in
order to build standing procedures, organizational structures and mutual trust.
Using the Arctic Center of Excellence described above, USFF should develop and maintain a
contact list of all domestic (e.g., Navy, joint, interagency, and industry) and international (e.g.,
all Arctic states‟ maritime forces and Arctic Council) Arctic. Within each of these respective
commands, indicate the commands‟ roles, responsibilities and capabilities pertaining to Arctic
planning and operations.
Develop and Manage Lessons Learned Database
Coordination with Navy, joint, interagency and industry as well as international maritime
partners in order to garner specific lessons learned regarding Arctic planning and operations
should expand. This should be integrated with other lessons learned using the Navy Lessons
Learned Database. Finally, applicable U.S. Navy lessons learned regarding operations in the
Arctic should be made available to other domestic and intentional Arctic stakeholders.
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Areas for Future Research
This section summarizes various areas for further study that may be useful to Commander, USFF
or other Arctic stakeholders through follow-on gaming or other research methods. These insights
may be useful to USFF as it seeks to improve the AMRF CONOPS and complete Arctic Road
Map tasking. The insights discussed in this report result from an inductive reasoning approach
and do not test a conclusive set of hypothetical actions that could be executed in a different
context – for instance, in the real world or even in other scenarios. However, the capability gaps,
mitigating strategies and proposed solutions developed by experts with a significant
understanding of the region and functional areas were broad in nature and are intended only to
indirectly inform Navy decisions regarding sustained maritime operations in the Arctic region.
This makes follow-on research efforts important to gaining a comprehensive understanding of
Arctic maritime operations.
U.S. Navy Doctrine and Strategy
Explore existing U.S. Naval strategy and its applicability to the Arctic region. Players asserted
myriad conditions and factors that are unique to the Arctic environment, which in turn,
substantially impact relationships, capabilities and information at the operational and tactical
levels. Leveraging the CS-21 refresher in 2012 would be an ideal forum to explore, how, if at all,
Arctic operations should be integrated for strategic consideration. One player noted, “It may
seem a retro move back to the Blue Nose Navy but we do need to update and re-think our old
doctrine for the area and then put it into practice in a way that allows us to evaluate and edit as
needed. Just jumping to the conclusion that it is „just colder but still Navy‟ is not a safe or really
effective way to approach this. Everything from cold water deck work to well deck operations,
flight ops and engineering must be carefully evaluated against our current state of technology on
ships.”
Relationships
Explore challenges and proposed collaborative solutions to sharing information (e.g.,
environmental information) among Arctic nations’ maritime forces in order to achieve
Maritime Domain Awareness. At a minimum, the challenges explored should include legal,
policy, cultural, and technical restrictions. Specific efforts in support of proposed collaborative
solutions should include: cooperative strategies and structures, supporting capabilities in an
information sharing system, and the specific information required to support national objectives.
Similarly, the integration or “fusion and analysis” of environmental information specific to the
Arctic region should also be considered within this research path.
Explore Command, Control, and Communications relationships among U.S. (Navy, Joint, and
Interagency) and international maritime partners (e.g., all Arctic states) in the Arctic. These
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relationships should be explored under various climatic conditions and seasons, missions or
operations (e.g., crisis or scheduled deployment), and geographical locations in the Arctic region.
Specific, gaps, seams, overlaps as well as supported and supporting relationships should be also
examined. Subsequently, further research should be conducted to explore the characteristics,
attributes, and responsibilities as well as the missions and organizational structure of a potential
Joint, Interagency Arctic Task Force comprised of U.S. and international stakeholders in the
Arctic region (e.g., JIATF North model proposed during gameplay).
Explore the sharing of operational data when coordinating and collaborating among relevant
U.S. and international Arctic stakeholders during operations in the Arctic (e.g., both crisis and
scheduled deployments). Specifically, examine information sharing processes and “real-time
data transfer for rapid access and translation into operational and research products, and
structures required to facilitate coordination among stakeholders both at sea and ashore. The
sharing of information should be explored through three lenses: pre-operations, during
operations, and post-operations.
Explore the integration of information (e.g., lessons learned) pertaining to Arctic operations
among relevant stakeholders in order to prepare Navy planners and operators for Arctic
operations. Elements of this study should include: operational requirements, categorization of
information, impediments to information sharing, and data standardization criteria. Some U.S.
based elements that can be leveraged include, Office of Naval Research, Navy Research Lab,
USACE Cold Regions Research and Engineering Lab, Naval Post Graduate School, Naval War
College, and the Arctic Submarine Lab. More importantly, lessons learned from commercial
industry and multinational civilian and military organizations should also be incorporated in this
study.
Capabilities
At the unclassified level, explore the capabilities and limitations of all domestic and
international Arctic stakeholders in order to establish a baseline understanding of capable and
available platforms, systems, and personnel in the region. Capability areas of focus should
include national space based assets, operating in high altitude regions, ice breakers and ice
hardened vessels, training and logistics facilities, and existing relationships among the local
populace and tribal leaders. This study would also specifically generate „lessons learned‟ from
multinational partners regarding the effects of cold weather conditions on maritime forces‟
equipment, platforms, and aircraft as well as communication systems.
Based on the reliability and frequency of U.S. Naval forces’ in the Arctic, the U.S. Navy
should conduct a feasibility study to explore the costs and benefits of platform acquisition.
Specifically, compare purchasing or leasing of ice breakers and ice capable vessels from industry
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and international partners, hardening existing U.S. Navy vessels (LCACs), and developing a new
„futuristic‟ ship designed to meet emerging requirements in the region.
Science & Technology
Explore alternative ways to employ capabilities (e.g., Maritime Domain Awareness, Maritime
Security and HADR) in the Arctic through the development and application of technological
solutions (satellites, sensors, etc.) vice a "Man on the Ice." More specifically, explore the use
of “sensors and sensor systems to improve observational programs, including the use of UUVs,
UAVs, acoustic navigation and communications.”
Logistics
Explore new and innovative ways to conduct resupply and refueling in the Arctic. Focus on
finding a reliable, cost efficient and effective fuel source through domestic or international
channels in order to refuel U.S. navy vessels during transit in the Arctic region. Specific areas of
research should include viable and reliable options for refueling and replenishment at sea, as well
as the use or development of shore infrastructure. “The U.S. Navy should leverage existing DoD
research initiatives that explore expeditionary power and logistics (including waste management)
in the Arctic.”
Environment
Explore new processes, relationships, and systems to improving weather and ice forecast
modeling in the Arctic region. Specific areas of further research should include factors and
processes that drive the retreat of the sea ice cover, atmospheric circulation, wildlife patterns,
surface radiation balance, ocean circulation and mixing, and waves and swell in ice. “Having
a better understanding of the myriad environmental considerations that impact operations (e.g.,
indigenous hunting grounds and marine mammals (noise, migratory patterns) in the Arctic will
better prepare U.S. Navy planners and operators.” Collaboration with U.S. and international
civilian universities, industry, and government organizations was highly encouraged.
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